

SHIFTING THE POWER

End of Project Evaluation

April 2018

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


Executive Summary

This evaluation aimed to assess the extent to which Shifting the Power (STP) had achieved its intended outcomes and to propose recommendations to continue its goals beyond its completion. The evaluation was carried out by a five person team from December 2017 to March 2018 and consulted 218 persons globally through interviews, focus group discussions, workshops and surveys.

STP was a £4.8 million three year project (2015–2017) funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), through its Disasters Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP) of the Start Network. STP was implemented by six international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) who worked with 55 local and national NGOs (L/NNGOs) in Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya and Pakistan. STP aimed to shift power towards locally owned and led humanitarian response and was based on five goals (or "outputs").

Findings:



Effectiveness: The capacities, leadership and voice of the 55 participating L/NNGOs have increased in the past three years through their involvement in STP. The increase seen in overall capacity matched the main desired outcome for STP.

The increased capacity was largely credited to the STP workstream (output 1) based on the Strategic Humanitarian Assessment and Participatory Empowerment (SHAPE) framework that was a major focus of the project in three domains:

- **Governance and leadership:** L/NNGOs reported building their capacity at the foundational level, such as in humanitarian strategies, administrative policies, procedures and processes, ranging from finance systems, human resource systems to procurement to security rules.
- **Preparedness and response:** 67% of surveyed L/NNGOs reported that in 2018 they are "better prepared than before" compared to 17% at the start of the project with 52 emergency/rapid response teams (ERTs) established.
- **Influence and voice:** This area (output 2) was given a lower priority by L/NNGO in their capacity development. Progress was seen in the influence area with 89% of surveyed L/NNGOs responding that their participation and voice had increased, notably seen in establishing/participating in networks, representation and joint actions.

Although 59% of surveyed L/NNGOs responded that funding opportunities had increased in the past three years it was in this area where least progress was reported. The output focusing on influencing INGOs (output 3) was also a lower focus for STP. A major activity was the global research study "Localisation of Aid: Are INGOs Walking the Talk?" In each of the countries, the proposed follow-up actions have been discussed but with limited concrete steps in place to date with the exception of Pakistan where a special initiative was launched, a Charter of Commitment for INGOs.

Impact: The ultimate goal of the project was to ensure L/NNGOs are able to contribute to faster, better quality and more effective humanitarian response. The evaluation found that STP has somewhat contributed to faster, better quality and more effective humanitarian response in some instances across the five STP countries. It has also put in place elements to ensure this in the future, such as through creating ERTs and the necessary policies of L/NNGOs in these countries.

Relevance: STP has produced an evidence base on “what works” in strengthening capacities, voice and influence of L/NNGOs (output 5). The main constraint identified was to what extent is this evidence base available and accessed by the relevant organisations and individuals. There have been some targeted learning events and advocacy activities with several INGOs HQ staff commenting that STP was a common reference for them. However, it was felt that the evidence base was not given the visibility it deserved.

Efficiency: The governance and management structure of the project helped shift the power to a certain degree but inconsistently across the project, as seen in the varying roles of INGOs and the Technical Working Groups at the country-level. The project design had some limitations with several key components missing, such as response financing and an INGO workstream. The project started with a strong focus on output 1 (capacity building) to the detriment of the other four outputs. This was adjusted mid-project but the late start, notably for output 2 (voice) and 3 (INGOs) led to the bulk of activities for these outputs taking place in the last six months of the project. DEPP collaboration and learning (output 4) was a lower priority for STP and focused mainly on training and learning. Despite these limitations, it should be recognised that STP did have a multiplication and replication effect increasing considerably its value for money.

Sustainability: STP has built significant capacity of its L/NNGO partners and there is a growing recognition of this capacity. However, this evaluation found that there was still considerable work ahead for both L/NNGOs and INGOs in addressing the goals of STP. The continuing engagement in and maximization of the national NGO platforms was seen as a way of extending the effect of the STP. Each STP country has reflected on sustainability and set out action plans and next steps. Sustainability of the progress made by STP and other DEPP projects was the focus of the Bangkok workshop in December 2017 where the STP INGOs committed to facilitate the next steps.

Conclusions and recommendations:

The capacity of the participating L/NNGOs has been strengthened through STP with changes to policies and practices that has boosted their preparedness, contribution and presence in humanitarian forums and laid the foundations for more effective and accountable humanitarian response in the five STP countries. This progress is thanks to STP in combination with other similar initiatives and the momentum created by the Grand Bargain and localisation agenda. The shift of power and a re-balancing of the humanitarian system have moved at a slower pace than the strengthening of L/NNGOs in the STP countries. Having successfully established an effective STP network across five countries, it is unfortunate that funding is not yet secured to move to the next steps that would logically focus on L/NNGOs being more active in humanitarian leadership and response.

Recommendations: Based on the evaluation’s key findings a set of five recommendations is proposed:

Participating INGOs have set out the broad lines of their commitments following STP but are yet to follow this with concrete plans on how (or if) they will continue support to participating L/NNGOs. Setting in place the concrete steps is challenging but the example of the INGOs in Pakistan with the Charter of Commitment shows how a “field to HQ” approach can work. The concept of STP also needs to go beyond those within INGOs who were implementing it. Given the strengthened capacity of L/NNGOs, INGO support could take the form of facilitation (to leadership roles and funding) and mentoring that would not be costly and maintain the momentum of STP. Further, the commitments made by INGOs at the 2017 Bangkok workshop should be maintained.

- **Recommendation 1:** Participating STP INGOs should set out their plans and commitments to build on the progress achieved by STP; the next steps should be facilitated through the commitments made in Bangkok, notably the establishment of a Secretariat and finalisation of a concept note for engagement with the Start Network and donors.

Participating L/NNGOs in all countries are now in a position where they can contribute to humanitarian preparedness and response and have set out some of their follow-up actions. L/NNGOs should continue

to ensure that what has been built by STP remains in place and is reinforced, such as validating new policies and practices by their governance. At the same time, all signs indicate that access to resources and leadership roles will increase but only gradually.

- **Recommendation 2:** Participating L/NNGOs should ensure that new policies and practices are approved by their governance and they continue with efforts towards professionalization, such as CHS accreditation/certifications; and that they continue to increase their role in humanitarian response based on a scenario of gradual increased access to resources and leadership roles.

L/NNGO networks were proven to be key in most countries to creating a joint voice and advocating for their “place at the table”. These networks are best positioned to gain the support of their communities and authorities and pressure the “power holders” to accelerate the shifting of power.

- **Recommendation 3:** L/NNGO networks should reinforce their ability to advocate for greater leadership and resources for L/NNGOs; framework and support can be developed in collaboration with INGOs.

Affected communities and first responders have proven key to responding to crises that impact them. Future iterations of STP and like-minded projects have to put communities at the centre of their action. Positive examples were seen with this within STP that are to be encouraged. Projects have to avoid simply shifting the power from an expatriate “power holders” to a new set of local “power holders”; thus the importance of community involvement.

- **Recommendation 4:** Affected communities should be central to the design of localisation and humanitarian response initiatives; concretely this means consulting communities in the design phase of projects; building in their participation in needs assessments, project implementation (see examples in this report) and evaluation; and allocating necessary budget to do so.

The “power holders” of the humanitarian system are under pressure to adapt their policies, procedures and approaches. There have already been positive developments, such as the opening of UN Pooled Fund to L/NNGOs in many countries, the planned adaption of the Start Fund to direct funding of L/NNGOs and the greater access of L/NNGOs to the UN cluster system. Yet for L/NNGOs and communities at the front line of crises, these changes have not yet been enough and consistently applied.

- **Recommendation 5:** Those “power holders” of the humanitarian system (namely INGOs, UN agencies, donor and emerging governments) should accelerate the shifting of power with priority given to accessing humanitarian funding for L/NNGOs. INGOs can help facilitate the process of dialogue with donor agencies to accelerate the process of localisation by addressing and “honouring” the commitment donors made during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit.

Lessons learnt

1. Capacity strengthening can produce results when L/NNGOs lead the process.
2. STP focused on building L/NNGO capacity but the system and INGOs needed equal attention to shift the power.
3. Shifting the power sustainably involved fitting into or building on existing government and community preparedness systems.
4. L/NNGOs working in development proved to be capable humanitarian partners.
5. Collaboration between L/NNGOs can increase the reach, value for money and quality of their activities.

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Sajida Foundation
UDPS-Uttara Development Program Society
Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK)
Christian Commission for Development in Bangladesh (CCDB)
Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK)
Shushilan
WCB-World Concern Bangladesh

DRC

Comité pour le Développement et Assistance Humanitaire (CODEVAH)
Programme d'Appui aux Comités de Développement des Villages (PACODEVI)
HEAL AFRICA
Centre de Promotion Socio-Economique Sanitaire (CEPROSSAN)
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Ethiopia

Community Initiatives Facilitation and Assistance (CIFA)
Action For Development (AFD)
Ethiopian Catholic Church Apostolic Vicariate of Hosanna (AVH)
Women Support Association (WSA)
Association for Nation Wide Action for Prevention and Protection Against Child Abuse and Neglect-(ANNPCAN)
Rift Valley Children and Women Development Association (RCWDA)
Centre for Development Initiative (CDI)
Terepeza Development Association (TDA)
SOS Sahel
HUNDEE-Grass Root Development Initiative

Kenya

Pastoralist Community Initiative and Development Assistance (PACIDA)
CARITAS-Marsabit
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CARITAS-Isiolo
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Pokot Women Empowerment Organisation (POWEO)
SIKOM Peace Network for Development
Arid Lands Development Focus (ALDEF)
Wajir South Development Association (WASDA)
Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS)
National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)

Pakistan

Participatory Rural Development Society (PRDS)
Bright Star Development Society Balochistan (BDSDB)
Research and Development Foundation (RDF)
Fast Rural Development Programme (FRDP)
Participatory Village Development Program (PVDP)
Association for Water Applied Education and Renewable Energy (AWARE)
Society for Safe Environment and Welfare of Agrarians in Pakistan (SSEWA-PAK)
VEER Development Organization (VDO)
Rural Education and Economic Development Society (REEDS)
Grassroots Pakistan (GRP)
Participatory Welfare Services (PWS)
Multan Diocese Trust Association (MDTA)

INGOs

ActionAid
CAFOD
Concern
Christian Aid
Oxfam
Tearfund

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Abbreviations

CCRDA	Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (Ethiopia)
CET	Country Evaluation Team
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard
DEPP	Disasters Emergency Preparedness Programme
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DDMA	District Disaster Management Authorities
DMA	Disaster Management Authorities
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ELNHA	Empowering Local and National Humanitarian Actors (Oxfam project)
ERT	Emergency Response Team
GB	Grand Bargain
HCTT	Humanitarian Country Task Team
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
INGOs	International non-governmental organisations
ISC	International Steering Committee
L/NNGOs	Local and national non-governmental organisations
NAHAB	National Alliance of Humanitarian Actors in Bangladesh
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
NHN	National Humanitarian Network (Pakistan)
NSC	National Steering Committee
PCP	Pakistan Centre of Philanthropy
RRT	Rapid Response Team
SHAPE	Strategic Humanitarian Assessment and Participatory Empowerment (Framework)
STP	Shifting the Power
TD	Talent Development (DEPP project)
ToC	Theory of Change
TSC	Transforming Surge Capacity (DEPP project)
TWG	Technical Working Group
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

1. Introduction

This document is the final report for the end of project evaluation of the Shifting the Power project (STP). The evaluation aimed to assess the extent to which STP had achieved its intended outcomes and to propose recommendations to continue its goals beyond its completion. The evaluation was carried out by a five person team from December 2017 to March 2018 and covered the full three year period of the project.

2. Background

STP was a £4.8 million project that ran from January 2015 to December 2017, with a no-cost extension until March 2018. STP was funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), through its Disasters Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP) of the Start Network. STP was implemented by six international non-governmental organisations (INGOs): ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Tearfund, Concern and Oxfam, who together formed the consortium that implemented STP, with ActionAid and CAFOD as lead agencies. Together the consortium worked with 55 local and national NGOs (L/NNGOs) in Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya and Pakistan. The aim of STP was described as following:

"The aim of STP is to support local actors to take their place alongside international actors in order to create a balanced humanitarian system. It will strengthen local and national organisational capacity for decision making and leadership in humanitarian response, support local organisations to have greater representation, voice and recognition in relevant networks and platforms, and at the same time influence international organisations to promote the role of local and national actors."¹

STP aimed to shift power towards locally owned and led responses with five goals (also referred to as "outputs"):

1. L/NNGO partners in five countries have the knowledge, skills, processes, and policies to prepare for and respond effectively to emergencies
2. L/NNGOs are better represented and have a stronger voice in relevant humanitarian platforms and networks
3. The consortium member INGOs recognise and respond to L/NNGO capacity, leadership & voice
4. The project collaborates with the other DEPP projects for maximising collaborative advantage
5. The project provides evidence of good practice in strengthening L/NNGOs humanitarian preparedness and response work and their role/influence in humanitarian action.

STP was overseen by an International Steering Committee (ISC) with National Steering Committees (NSC) and Technical Working Groups (TWG) in each of the five countries. An international project management team based in ActionAid London was supported by country-level project teams of between two to five persons.

3. Methodology

The overall objective of the evaluation was to assess the project's theory of change, that is "a shift of power towards locally owned and led responses will contribute to a more balanced humanitarian system that delivers more effective and accountable humanitarian response."² On this basis the evaluation's objectives were:

¹ As quoted in the STP 2015 Annual Report.

² As quoted in Lewinsky, T. 2016, "Getting into SHAPE? A Review of Shifting the Power's Organisational Capacity Assessment Approach". STP Learning review 1.

1. Assess the project against the OECD–DAC criteria of: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact.
2. Assess the extent to which the project has progressed towards its intended outcomes as given in project plans and against logframe indicators.
3. To address the project’s key learning questions and summarise lessons learnt from implementation in each country and globally, and, make recommendations for key stakeholders as to how they can best continue to work towards the project’s goal.

These objectives were operationalized through 13 questions that are detailed in the evaluation matrix found at annex 1 and form the basis of the findings of this report.

The evaluation team adopted a participatory approach emphasising interaction and involvement with the participating L/NNGOs and INGOs notably through visits to the five countries. In each country, a Country Evaluation Team (CET) of L/NNGO and INGO staff supported the evaluation team. The team used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to collect data from a total of 218 persons globally:

- 9 outcome workshops were held with 91 representatives of L/NNGOs in Bukavu and Goma (DRC), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), three different locations in Kenya, Dhaka (Bangladesh), Hyderabad Sindh and Islamabad (Pakistan).
- 99 semi-structured interviews with representatives of the L/NNGOs, INGOS, local authorities and UN agencies.
- 2 focus group discussions were held with affected communities in Kibumba, North Kivu province, DRC and the Umerkot district in the Sindh province, Pakistan.
- 58 responses to an online survey of participating L/NNGOs (40) and INGOs (18 country offices and 1 HQ staff) were received. Network mapping was carried out for one country (Bangladesh) based on the survey responses. Survey questions used are found at annex 6.
- 4 case studies and 5 snapshots of different aspects of STP as found at annex 4 of this report.
- 4 validation workshops of finding were held with in-country stakeholders in Addis Ababa, Goma, Dhaka and Islamabad (the dispersed nature of STP in Kenya made this not possible; more so individual discussions were held with key stakeholders).



Group interview, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.
Credit: AM Dizon.



Outcome workshop, Goma, DRC. Credit: STP.

The list of workshop participants and persons interviewed is found at annex 2. Of note, some people who were interviewed also participated in outcome and/or validation workshops.

The evaluation was supported by a Steering Group composed of the International Project Manager and four members of the ISC and the TWGs that validated the key deliverables and met (remotely) with the evaluation team three times.

The data and information collected was collated, triangulated and analysed and forms the basis of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this report. The STP baseline, the three previous STP learning reviews, DEPP research/reviews and the “Localisation of Aid: Are INGOs Walking the Talk?” research study complemented this analysis in addition to other monitoring and reporting data.³ A summarised version of the STP logframe with endline results as found by this evaluation is detailed in annex 5.

Strengths and Limitations: A key strength of the evaluation was that the evaluation team engaged in-person with nearly all participating L/NNGOs and INGOs, for example with 51 out of 55 L/NNGOs during the country visits and the majority (40) responded to the online survey; in total only three L/NNGOs did not participate in the evaluation. This allowed the evaluation to be confident that its findings are representative overall of STP. The multi-person evaluation team and the support of the CETs brought different perspectives and skills strengthening the evaluation process and deliverables. However, some limitations were seen:

Consistent role for CETs: In each country, the evaluation team worked with L/NNGO and INGO staff that made up the CET. It proved not feasible to have a common composition and role for the CET and so it varied from country to country, depending upon the availability of the CET members, their location and where geographically the project was active. Nevertheless, the evaluation team ensured that L/NNGO and INGO staff were involved as much as possible in the in-country workshops and discussions.

Availability of all relevant INGO and L/NNGO staff: STP was concluding as the evaluation was being carried out. As a result, members of the country-level project teams were leaving their posts to take up new roles. This was not a major obstacle as in all five countries at least one member was still in place to support the evaluation team. At the same time, as STP covered a three-year period, not all INGO and L/NNGO staff that were involved in the project were still in their positions and available to the evaluation team. The evaluation team could not access some of the country directors/representatives of INGOs and executive directors in L/NNGOs, and so some useful highlights from them may have been missed.



Emergency response distribution – Caritas Goma, DRC. Credit: Caritas Goma.

3 See annex 3 for the full list of documents consulted.

4. Findings


4.1. Effectiveness

To what extent and in what ways have capacities, leadership, and voice of the 55 local and national organisations in five countries increased?

“STP has increased our capacity to respond through our new humanitarian strategy, motivated staff and skills in needs assessments” L/NNGO Executive Director

The capacities, leadership and voice of the 55 participating L/NNGOs have increased in the past three years through their involvement in STP corresponding to its desired outcome. 97% of the surveyed L/NNGOs indicated that the overall capacity of their organisations for humanitarian response has increased in this timeframe with 77% attributing this “quite some” or “a lot” to STP.

Further, 92% responded that support to their capacity building for humanitarian response had increased in past three years. The increased capacity was largely credited to the STP workstream (output 1) based on the Strategic Humanitarian Assessment and Participatory Empowerment (SHAPE) Framework that was a major focus of the project. All 55 L/NNGOs produced self-assessments and capacity building plans that guided their consequent activities. An immediate result was the training and related knowledge gains for L/NNGOs:



Increased capacity was seen in the three domains of the SHAPE framework - 1) governance and leadership, 2) preparedness and response 2) influence - in all countries and to varying degrees, as found also by the third STP learning review (2017)⁴. This learning review highlighted why the approach of the SHAPE framework was more successful than other capacity building approaches that were also confirmed by this evaluation:


- The identification of priority areas for capacity strengthening was done by the L/NNGOs rather than the INGOs.
- The SHAPE framework focused on organisational capacity (rather than project/programme capacity) and the inclusion of ‘influence’ and ‘power’ offered a new perspective.
- There was continuous follow-up by in-country STP teams which helped maintain momentum for the activities.
- The L/NNGOs met regularly over three years providing opportunities for exchange, learning and collaboration.
- L/NNGOs played a lead role in their own capacity strengthening activities.

The SHAPE framework also had some limitations; its level of detail was considered too complex by some L/NNGOs (see section 4.4).

⁴ Rogers, E. (September 2017). *How has Shifting the Power influenced local and national partner’s responses to emergencies?* STP Learning Review 2.

Governance and leadership: Within this domain, L/NNGOs reported building their capacity at the foundational level, such as development of humanitarian strategies, as seen in six of the L/NNGOs in DRC. This was also considered important given that the majority of L/NNGOs were mainly experienced in the development field. Another major area was the development of administrative policies, procedures and processes, ranging from finance systems, human resource systems to procurement to security rules. For example 11 L/NNGOs in Pakistan and 11 L/NNGOs in Kenya reported that they had revised their organisational policies in these areas. Positively, L/NNGOs commented that these changes benefited their organisations as a whole, for example, their development and humanitarian activities and improved their overall professionalism. On the other hand, a number of L/NNGOs staff indicated that some policies were still in draft form and yet to be approved by their governance bodies. The question of leadership roles in humanitarian response is discussed under the next question.


Preparedness and response: A major benefit of STP was seen in the preparedness it provided for L/NNGOs and their consequent ability to respond to emergencies: at least 37 out of the 55 L/NNGOs reported that they had responded to emergencies since STP started. A most recent example was with the response to the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh where seven L/NNGOs responded. 67% of surveyed L/NNGOs reported that in 2018 they are “better prepared than before” compared to 17% at the start of the project. One area of preparedness that was common across countries was the creation of emergency or rapid response teams (ERTs/RRTs), often supported by the development of emergency preparedness and response plans:



The establishment of ERTs within L/NNGOs was also complemented by ERTs established at the community level (see highlight box on local communities (section 4.2) and case studies on Ethiopia, Kenya and Pakistan at annex 4).

Another response area highlighted in all five countries was the carrying out of needs assessments with 82% of surveyed L/NNGOs having led in the design or implementation of an assessment in the past three years.


In the last three years, has your organisation led in the design or implementation of a joint humanitarian needs assessment or evaluation? – those answering “Yes”



Influence and voice: Compared to the two previous domains of capacity, this area was given a lower priority by L/NNGOs in their capacity development, despite “advocacy” receiving the overall lowest rating from the SHAPE self-assessments⁵. This was recognised midway by the STP ISC and an International Advocacy Advisor appointed in April 2017 who implemented a global advocacy strategy supporting national plans that provided a boost in this area for the last eight months of STP. Despite this late focus, progress was seen in the influence area with 89% of surveyed L/NNGOs responding that their participation and voice had increased with 71% indicating that STP contributed “quite some” or “a lot” to this increase. Progress was notably seen in establishing/participating in networks, representation (discussed further below) and joint actions, as seen in the doubling of L/NNGOs participating in lobbying or collective action during STP:

⁵ 1.5 out of 4 for the “Advocacy” area, as cited in the 2nd learning review: Tanner, L. (2017) *Increasing the Voice and Influence of Local and National NGOs*.

In the last three years, has your organisation been involved in lobbying others or taking collective action to improve humanitarian policy and practice in this country? – those answering “Yes”



An example of a collective action was the joint advocacy effort carried out by the three L/NNGO platforms in DRC (CCONAT, RHOND and FONHAD) at the national level and consequent establishment of a common operational plan for 2018 (see snapshot at annex 4). In Kenya, ALDEF, WASDA, and POWEO were successful in integrating women’s voices in county disaster management plans. In Ethiopia, a Humanitarian Platform was established under the aegis of Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA) to champion for humanitarian and administrative issues of L/NNGOs. STP also supported the creation of the National Alliance of Humanitarian Actors in Bangladesh (NAHAB) that has set out a five year strategic plan. At the international level, STP aimed to have its voice present in relevant forums through the participation of L/NNGOs, such as at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and visibility within the humanitarian system, such as in the Grand Bargain (GB) workstream on support and funding to local responders where STP was cited as an example of progress towards the GB commitments⁶.

The establishment/participation in networks was where considerable progress was seen in the area of “influence and voice” in all countries:

DRC	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Ethiopia	Kenya
Alliance of three L/NNGO platforms and 2018 common operational plan established.	Creation of NAHAB for better representation of L/NNGOS in humanitarian coordination and other fora.	All 12 participating L/NNGOs now part of National Humanitarian Network (NHN). Five are also part of DRR Forum Sindh Chapter with FRDP (STP partner) leading the Forum.	First national humanitarian forum was launched within CCRDA.	There was no national humanitarian forum. However, ALDEF and WASDA in Northern Kenya are part of Northern Kenya National NGOs Caucus.

Part of the influence domain of the SHAPE framework concerned resource mobilisation; this is discussed in the next question.

As illustrated in the highlight box below, the nature and type of networks of the participating L/NNGOs changed during STP’s duration, also supporting the outcome-level indicator of their increased interconnect- edness and influence.


⁶ See Independent Grand Bargain Report (2017): <http://www.gppi.net/publications/humanitarian-action/article/independent-grand-bargain-report/>

Changes to L/NNGO network in Bangladesh – 2015 to 2018


Strengthening and transforming the networks of the participating L/NNGOs was one way of increasing their access, voice and leadership. A mapping of the L/NNGOs networks from 2015 to 2018 in Bangladesh illustrates how the networks have changed. Measured at both the baseline (2015) and by this evaluation (2018), participating L/NNGOs were asked to indicate the partners they collaborate the most with for humanitarian response. The chart below shows the development from 2015 to 2018 with each node (circle, box, triangle, star or diamond) representing an individual organisation and arrows indicating the connections between the organisations. The following main changes to the networks were seen from 2015 to 2018:

- The network in 2015 was very “INGO-centric” with 12 INGOs and 11 L/NNGOs; in 2018 there were 7 INGOs and 18 L/NNGOs and thus a more balanced INGO-L/NNGO network.
- In 2015 there was only one relationship L/NNGO to L/NNGO with most relations passing through INGOs; in 2018 there were 11 L/NNGO to L/NNGO relationships.
- In 2015, no network organisation was identified as playing a role in the 2015 network whereas in 2018, a network organisation (NAHAB, identified as a star), played a central role in the network. Further no L/NNGOs played a central role in the 2015 network whereas at least two L/NNGOs played a central role in 2018.

2015 - Bangladesh network (11 L/NNGOs)



2018 - Bangladesh network (11 L/NNGOs)



▲ UN ★ Networks ■ L/NNGO ● INGO ◆ Government ▼ Donor


How have L/NNGOs influenced decision making of, improved access on information and resources, and undertaken leadership roles in national humanitarian platforms and networks through STP?

The influence and access to national humanitarian platforms and networks has improved for L/NNGOs through STP, although access to resources was less evident.


As described above, considerable progress was seen in the access, participation and representation of L/NNGOs in platforms and networks in all five countries. For example, the creation of NAHAB in Bangladesh has led to better representation of L/NNGOs in the Humanitarian Country Task Team (HCTT); in DRC, a participating L/NNGO, Caritas Congo now represents L/NNGOs in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). Whilst the majority of L/NNGOs were already participating in networks and platforms prior to STP, linked to their increased response capacity, L/NNGOs commented that their contribution was now much more valuable, such as presenting results of needs assessments in clusters that could trigger action by other humanitarian actors. Surveyed L/NNGOs also reported increases in leading and participating in platforms and networks:

In the last three years, has your organisation led (i.e. chaired or taken other official position on) any humanitarian working group, network, or coordination mechanisms? – those answering “Yes”

2015 2018



In the last three years, has your participated in any official humanitarian working group, network, or coordination mechanisms? – those answering “Yes”



Examples were seen where leadership roles were increasing for STP L/NNGOs, such as:

- FRDP is leading the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Forum in Sindh province, Pakistan;
- In Pakistan, L/NNGOs are leading the development of District Disaster Emergency Preparedness and/or Contingency Plans
- PPSSP is the co-lead of the Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster, Caritas Goma is the co-lead of the Shelter cluster; and Heal Africa is the co-lead of the Protection cluster, North Kivu, DRC;
- Recognition of NAHAB in leading coordinated assessments in Bangladesh;
- The executive director of Caritas Maralal is the current chair of the STP NSC in Kenya.

“We now have something to say in the clusters – to present our needs assessments for example – we are no longer there simply to ‘warm the chairs’” L/NNGO focal point

Further, 74% of surveyed L/NNGOs responded that participation of national aid workers, organisations and authorities in the coordination of planning and project design had increased in the past three years.


At the same time, L/NNGOs commented on the barriers faced by them in accessing leadership roles. These were a combination of factors including the slow adaptation of the humanitarian system to be accessible to L/NNGOs; the unwillingness of other humanitarian actors (notably UN agencies and INGOs) to share or handover leadership roles to L/NNGOs; and the instability of funding for L/NNGOs meaning that assuming leadership roles was challenging.

“Thanks to STP we were able to complete our first needs assessment that identified over 4,500 households in need following community violence – but we couldn’t find the funding to respond – ultimately we shared our assessment with OCHA and others”

Concerning access to resources, although 59% of surveyed L/NNGOs responded that funding opportunities had increased in the past three years (30% responded it “stayed roughly the same” and 10% said it “decreased”), it was in this area where least progress was reported by L/NNGOs. 54% of surveyed L/NNGOs responding that STP contributed “quite some” or “a lot” to increasing their funding opportunities, lower than for capacity (77%) and voice (71%).

An indication of this situation was the lack of progress seen during STP in L/NNGOs having their own emergency funds:

Does your organisation have its own emergency reserve funds you can use in emergency (to begin operations in advance of new donor funding for response)?



Examples were seen where L/NNGOs did access funding or qualified for funding channels, such as:

- ECC MERU, Caritas Goma, BOAD and CEPROSSAN in DRC received over USD\$ 2 million in funding for their humanitarian operations (Mennonite Church of Congo, UN Pooled Funds, the Start Fund and UNICEF)
- CODEVAH and EEC MERU were selected for UN Pooled Funds eligibility in DRC;
- 10 L/NNGOs in Pakistan were selected for UN Pooled Funds eligibility with one (PRD) already securing funding. In addition, another L/NNGO, Participatory Welfare Services (PWS) received in-kind assistance from Qarshi Industry, a leading industrial company in the country.
- For the Rohingya response, Caritas Bangladesh secured funding from the Start Fund while GUK has established partnerships with UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA and UNDP.
- DAM secured funding from the Empowering Local and National Humanitarian Actors (ELNHA) project of Oxfam in Bangladesh to respond to the Haor flash flooding in a consortium with non-STP partners.
- ALDEF, WASDA, Caritas Isiolo, Maralal & Marsabit and PACIDA in Kenya secured funds for emergency response.
- SOS-Sahel Ethiopia secured USD\$ 530,000 from the UN-OCHA Emergency Response Fund for a live-stock response project.

STP provided training on fundraising skills in all countries. For example, Caritas Maralal in Kenya participated in a "Write Shop" (i.e. fundraising workshop) in collaboration with County Government Officials and used the knowledge and skills to not only fundraise for a Drought Emergency Response but also to support the establishment of a radio station as part of their advocacy work. At the same time, some L/NNGOs had submitted various proposals for funding but were discouraged when they never secured any responses let alone funding.

The STP ISC and teams did recognise that access to funding was a key component in order for L/NNGOs to put into practice their reinforced capacity and a possible gap in the project design (the similar ELNHA project does have a funding component). In this respect, STP in Ethiopia, DRC and Kenya encouraged partners to use their STP capacity strengthening grants to conduct needs assessments or contribute to immediate/initial responses. In Ethiopia, outside of these grants, GBP 55,600 was reallocated for direct response for a participating L/NNGO. INGOs such as Christian Aid and CAFOD secured funding for STP L/NNGOs, notably for the Rohingya response (see highlight box below) and drought in Kenya. The ISC also initiated a discussion and proposal for a direct L/NNGO funding channel through the Start Fund but it was not successful to date. In parallel, the Start Fund in response to a localisation review has committed in 2017 to *"giving trusted national and local NGOs equal status to access Start Funds directly"*⁷

In what ways has the project addressed the barriers and challenges posed by international humanitarian agencies to support new roles and ways of working with local and national organisations?

"There are a lot of potential among the L/NNGOs in Bangladesh. But if you go to Cox's Bazaar for the Rohingya response, all of the INGOs are directly working there...This is a conflict of interest – (perhaps) some INGO colleagues think they will lose their job if the role of L/NNGOs are increased." - Chief Executive, L/NNGO

STP addressed the barriers and challenges of international humanitarian agencies to support new roles and ways of working with L/NNGOs mainly through research and advocacy that has seen limited progress to date. Compared to output 1 (capacity building) and output 2 (voice), this output was a lower focus for STP, according to both participating L/NNGOs and INGOs.

⁷ Start Fund Management Response; Localisation Review (July 2017): <https://start-network.app.box.com/s/vantp6lljyva-to72liilofcicdewfu4>

A major activity was the global research study “Localisation of Aid: Are INGOs Walking the Talk?” that comprised country-level and global studies and was launched in November 2017. The report aimed to provoke a discussion and follow-up actions by INGOs both at the country level and globally. In each of the countries, the proposed follow-up actions have been discussed within the NSC, TWG and/or between participating L/NNGOs and INGO, but with limited concrete steps in place to date⁸. An exception is Pakistan where a special initiative was launched, a Charter of Commitments for INGOs (see highlight box below). At the same time, 75% of surveyed INGOs reported that they had changed an element of their policy or practice in direct response to a request or suggestion from a national/local partner in the past three years, compared to 29% in 2015. INGOs provided some examples of how they have done this, with most of them being at the country-level (also reflecting that INGO country staff mainly responded to the survey – 18 of 19 responses), as follows (examples from individual INGOs):

- “Shadowing” of NGO staff in several INGO departments (finance and logistics) at the country-level.
- INGO insurance coverage for partner staff during their deployment in emergency response.
- Change to project design with local partners to better meet minimum Standards for Age and Disability (change requested by partner).
- Supporting L/NNGOs to access the Start Fund, other sources and qualify for UN Pool Funding.

Progress was seen in the attitudes of INGOs concerning the technical capacity and leadership of L/NNGOs that was also reflected in the discussions with both INGOs and L/NNGOs:



INGOs interviewed indicated the challenges faced in responding to this aspect of STP, such as shrinking resources for their own operations; the clash between localisation, due diligence and anti-terrorism measures; the availability of local partners in all conflict-affected countries; competing views on localisation within INGOs; and slow pace of change within INGOs and donors. Further, the late start of the advocacy aspect meant that only limited progress could be made to creating a momentum amongst INGOs not part of STP.

A gap identified in STP was the absence of a workstream that focused on INGOs and their policies and practices, as the L/NNGOs had with the SHAPE framework. More so, the role of INGOs in STP was to over-

⁸ See the STP Annual Report 2017 for a summary of planned INGO follow-up actions.

see, host and provide technical guidance to L/NNGOs. The charter initiative in Pakistan provides an illustration as what a workstream could have looked like across STP, as detailed in the highlight box below.

The INGO Charter of Commitments in Pakistan

A Charter of Commitments was signed by five INGOs in Pakistan with an accompanying Commitment Results Index to monitor and assess the specific actions made by each agency through the NHN.

Pakistan is the only country where such a charter was created as one of the initiatives of STP. Trocaire and four participating INGOs; ActionAid, Concern Worldwide, Tearfund and Oxfam have signed the Charter whereas UNICEF and UNOCHA have endorsed it. Two non-STP INGOs, Muslim Aid and Care International also signed the Charter. The commitments of the INGOs included:

- ActionAid resolved to continue its long-term partnership with local organisations and discouraged project-bound relationship; it also committed to actively promote and recognize the role of local civil society organisations spearheading joint assessments across all phases of disaster management cycle. ActionAid aims to allocate at least 70% of the total budget of any humanitarian project/initiative to local partners.
- Concern Worldwide pledged to review its existing partnership policy and make changes, if needed; it will incorporate policies, including the Protection of Programme Participants, and code of conduct, Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS), Concern equality policy, and social mobilization, to ensure impartial assistance based on the needs and capacities of communities and people affected by crisis. In order to avoid competition with its local partners, Concern will not take part in a financial bid if its partners are applying for it. Concern aims to allocate between 65-75% to L/NNGOs for humanitarian response.
- Oxfam committed to involving local humanitarian actors in capacity building initiatives and to set-up seed money for systems strengthening of local partners. Oxfam aims to allocate 40% of annual humanitarian funds to local partners.
- Tearfund committed to facilitate partners to forge partnerships with government departments i.e. District/ Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (DMA); and will continue to invest in building the capacity of local organisations around emergency preparedness and response. It also resolved to continue to capacitate local organisations around resource mobilization and development of funding strategies, strengthening of financial systems, and in helping them develop their policies and systems. Tearfund aims to allocate 70% of humanitarian funds to local partners.

The INGOs also made commitment to respond to category 3 emergencies through local partners, and would discourage direct implementation. Overall, with the support and monitoring of NHN, these commitments will enable INGOs in Pakistan to move forward in implementing their actions, processes and policies to shift the power towards locally-owned and led humanitarian response.



Community members fetching water from STP partner PACIDA's water trucking interventions in Koronder Village, Marsabit County, Kenya. Credit: PACIDA.

4.2. Impact

To what extent has STP contributed to faster, better quality and more effective humanitarian responses?

The ultimate goal of the project was to ensure L/NNGOs are able to contribute to faster, better quality and more effective humanitarian response. The evaluation found that STP has somewhat contributed to faster, better quality and more effective humanitarian response in some instances and in the five STP countries. It has also put in place elements to ensure this in the future, such as through creating ERTs and the necessary L/NNGO policies in these countries. 51% of participating L/NNGOs in the third learning review said their organisation is now able to respond faster to an emergency. However, it remains too early to say if this is a considerable impact. More so, examples were seen which collectively illustrate how L/NNGOs are moving towards this goal of more rapid response in the STP countries:

- In Ethiopia, AVHO formed a 10-member ERT composed of staff from various sectors (e.g. WASH, Livelihoods etc.) and headed by the Executive Director. AVHO reported that prior to formation of the ERT, response was often delayed due to reliance on a development approach coupled with lengthy bureaucratic procedures. But the ERT team developed an ERT guide which enabled them in 2017 to respond to drought within a period of 15 days – whereas previously it took them over 3 months to respond.
- In Kenya, Caritas Maralal secured funding from Catholic Relief Services after capacity building and have now prepositioned livestock pellets that can be distributed immediately to farmers to salvage their cattle in the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa.
- In Pakistan 10 L/NNGOs reported that their response time had decreased to 24 hours from 2-3 days previously.

Both L/NNGOs and INGOs indicated aspects that they believed would contribute to better quality and more effective humanitarian response:

- **The strengthened capacity** described in section 4.1 above, notably in preparatory plans, needs assessments and creation of ERTs/RRTs that allow more targeted and tailored responses.
- **Ability to bring the response closer to the affected communities:** For example, in DRC, the establishment of 9 community level response plans and memorandums of understanding with 17 local authorities; and the establishment of volunteer response teams in Kenya (see case study – annex 4).
- **Validation by third party quality assurance:** For example, 11 L/NNGO have been certified by the Pakistan Centre of Philanthropy (PCP) that facilitated their registration with Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (registering authority for L/NNGOs and provided tax exemption. In Bangladesh, 6 L/NNGOs have gained Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) accreditation/certification.
- **Establishing of complaint response mechanisms:** 2 L/NNGOs in DRC and 11 L/NGOs in Pakistan set up Complaint Response Mechanism to ensure accountability to affected communities.

STP and its impact on affected communities

In DRC, HEAL Africa, an STP L/NNGO initiated a community group in Kibumba, North Kivu Region, in December 2016 to respond to crisis that impact on the community. The group elected members of the community to spearhead their activities. Following capacity building training from STP via Heal Africa, the community has taken charge in constructing their own local health centre, classrooms, and mobilized the youth to improve rural roads to access remote areas. “We are using the spirit of the project to mobilize the community to do its own work and improve the area. We collaborate with STP through sharing ideas and enhancing community participation” commented a community volunteer. When there was a cholera outbreak in April 2017, the committee undertook a sensitization and clean-up of the community for three months. However, there are other challenges – such as living harmoniously with dangerous wildlife and the risk of drought – that the committee feels unable to tackle and still lack the voice to advocate for these issues to the regional authorities in Goma.

In the Umerkot district in the Sindh province, Pakistan, the Association for Water, Applied Education & Renewable Energy (AWARE), an STP L/NNGO has worked with the community to set up ERTs at the Union Council level (village level). Establishing ERTs provided a more sustainable response to the many risks the community faces that includes earthquakes, floods, droughts, fires and poisonous insect bites compared to the punctual assistance, such as food packages that they previously received. “With STP we realised the strength we have as a community” commented a community volunteer. Trained by AWARE in first aid and basic prevention and response skills, the ERTs met monthly to coordinate and had established relations with the emergency services of the government who were now accessible for the communities through the collective voice of the ERTs. Communication and coordination between villages responding to crises had also improved through the ERTs. Women played an active role in the ERTs and efforts were made to include the most vulnerable in discussions and decision-making.



Discussion with women from the ERT and community of Umerkot district, the Sindh province, Pakistan. Credit: STP.


To what extent has the STP Theory of Change (ToC) proven to be accurate?

The ToC was accurate in most respects but missed some elements and underplayed others. The diagram below shows a summarised ToC with comments overlaid based on the feedback collected by this evaluation.

At the input and activity level, there were two elements that this evaluation found were missing as described in section 4.1: an L/NNGO funding component and an INGO workstream.

At the output level, output 3 was less successful considering the missing workstream and the issues described in section 4.1. At the outcome level, it could be seen where barriers outside of STP hindered their full achievement. For example, the access to funding was a major barrier that was underestimated in the ToC as key in reaching the ultimate goal, which was reflected in the limited inputs and activities assigned to it. The same can be seen with the role of INGOs; the need that they recognise and promote L/NNGOs turned out to be key but had limited resources and focus in STP.

The impact level of the ToC also implies a global impact on emergency response; progress was seen across all five participating countries but not outside of these countries, as far as this evaluation could identify. This also was related to the late priority given to advocacy at the global level and the barriers within INGOs and other humanitarian actors.



What have been the positive and negative unintended consequences of STP?

The following table summarises the positive and negative unintended consequences of STP. Two-letter country codes denote the country(s) applicable.

Positive	Negative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The professionalization of L/NNGOs thanks to the capacity building activities (all countries). • The development of partnerships and coordinator with other participating L/NNGOs (all countries). • Reinforcement of the partnerships between L/NNGOs and INGOs (all countries). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on capacity building took L/NNGOs away from responding in their communities (DRC). • "Brain drain" of L/NNGO staff trained through STP then leaving for other posts (BD, DRC, ET). • Work with STP was not compensated for L/NNGO and INGO staff leading in some cases questioning from their management as to this "additional" workload (ET, DRC, KE, PK).

Positive	Negative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforcement or creation of relationships between L/NNGOs, local authorities, communities and other humanitarian actors (all countries). • The attracting of new partners for L/NNGOs (DRC, KE). • Visibility of L/NNGOs nationally and/or in the community (all countries). • At community level acceptability of women staff and also the participation of women from the community is increased (PK, BD, KE). • Realization among L/NNGOs of the important role women can play in responding to emergencies (PK, BD, KE). • STP allowed participating L/NNGOs and INGOs to work in consortium which is an approach increasingly encouraged by donors (all countries). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in STP increased expectations of authorities and communities in L/NNGOs as to their capacity to respond (which was not always possible due to lack of funding) (DRC, PK). • New importance given to L/NNGOs risks to create a new “power elite” of local actors in communities (all countries).

Responding to crises – positive / negative consequences for STP

Perhaps one challenge that may be seen as an unintended consequence of the increased capacity of the STP partners, was the “disruption” caused by responding to crises. For the Rohingya emergency response in Bangladesh, a few INGO partners observed how it “disturbed” STP as project resources – TWG members and L/NNGO leaders/focal persons – were “sucked” into the response, while at the same time other local disaster responses, such as the Northern floods for example, were given a lower priority. In a way, the Rohingya response was a good opportunity for the organisations, developed and strengthened through STP, to test their capacities in a totally new kind of emergency response. It was an opportunity to test the expanding capacity of partner organisations and their human resources. The enormous scale of the response was overwhelming and INGOs tended to respond as they were used to doing in the past. But in the process, the involvement of STP partners affected the last months of the project in terms of the necessary inputs expected from project resource that had been shifted somewhere else. On a smaller scale, The major drought in Kenya and Ethiopia of 2017 became an opportunity for STP partners to test and apply their improved capacities in support of the response, for example by conducting needs assessments in Ethiopia and advocating for improved coordination and getting the voices of affected communities heard in Kenya.



Hasina Begun (20) a young Rohingya woman, is waiting for food relief at a distribution point of Caritas(STP partner) in Ukhiya Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. Credit: Kayal Ahmed Leon, Christian Aid.

4.3. Relevance

How has the project contributed to strengthening the evidence base of what works in strengthening capacities, voice and influence of local and national organisations?

“STP has produced a lot of learning on “what works” – but we don’t see this yet being picked up by actors outside of the project” Focal point, L/NNGO

STP has produced an evidence base on “what works” in strengthening capacities, voice and influence of L/NNGOs (output 5). This evidence base is seen mainly in the baseline study, three learning reviews, “Walking the Talk” research in addition to the some 30 country-level case studies and the contributions to the DEPP research and learning studies/reviews.

The main constraint identified by both L/NNGOs and INGOs was to what extent is this evidence base available and accessed by the relevant organisations and individuals. There have been some targeted learning events in this respect, as detailed in the next section. Further, advocacy activities have contributed to this evidence base becoming known with some success, as seen in the visibility of STP within the localisation debate and also within INGOs. In this respect, several INGOs HQ staff commented that STP was a common reference for them within their organisation. However, it was felt that the evidence base was not being given the visibility it deserved, such as through wider sharing and use by participating INGOs and L/NNGOs, a challenge it shared with other DEPP projects, such as the Transforming Surge Capacity (TSC) project.

4.4. Efficiency

How has the project’s governance and management structure helped shift the power?

“We were very conscious of the entire philosophy around the project. It did take us some time to understand and own the idea and when we got into the group we have been very committed. There was a huge emphasis on capacity building and exposure of the local team and we have always kept the L/NNGOs at the forefront – so we have given them space.” – Country Director, INGO

The governance and management structure of the project helped shift the power to a certain degree but inconsistently across the project. This was observed across the five countries where the governance system functioned, including the variation seen in the roles of INGOs and the TWGs, as with the involvement of L/NNGOs in the governance of the project. Where the management and governance structure were able to mirror the gradual shift, or balancing of power at the governance level, L/NNGO partners recognized the opportunity to step up.

In Bangladesh, the STP project has re-shaped the original governance and management structure in order to try and ensure a shift of power at this level, which included restructuring the NSC so that it was co-chaired by one of the 11 L/NNGO partners and not just composed of INGOs. The Bangladesh NSC saw that ensuring the representation of L/NNGO partners in the NSC was important and it is reported that they were critically involved in leading the project and deciding on its framework and implementation. A similar approach was also taken in Kenya where the chairing of the NSC alternates between the INGOs and L/NNGOs.

But as noted above, this shift has not been consistent across the STP implementing countries; for instance, in DRC and Ethiopia, the NSC was limited to the INGO partners, with L/NNGOs added in Ethiopia at a later stage. In Pakistan, the NSC contained INGO partners and a representative of the national network NHN and in late 2017, two partner L/NNGOs were added. For the ISC, it started with only London-based INGO representatives and was extended to include country-based INGO staff although not L/NNGOs. Challenges faced by NSCs were the turnover of expatriate INGO staff, the dispersed location of the INGOs (notably DRC) and the varying participation of the non-host INGOs as discussed below.

Have resources been used efficiently? In general, do the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results be achieved with fewer resources?

Most of the project activities had high value for money according to cost and the value of the output it generated for partners across the board. Considering that the countries implementing STP come from the two continents with the highest number of natural disasters and affected population (see table below) according to the ten-year data compiled by the World Disaster Report in 2015, the start of the project implementation, the project inputs provided were highly relevant and targeted.

Total number of natural disasters and total number of people affected by continent (2005 – 2014)

Continent	Number of natural Disasters	People Affected (reported)	Percentage of Global affected people
Asia	2,556	1,579,209,000	82%
Africa	1,522	260,363,000	13%

(Source: IFRC, World Disaster Report 2015)

The annual cost of supporting each of the 55 L/NNGOs was an investment of between £7-10,000 a year per organisation as seen in the table below. Considering the outcomes described above, especially when it comes to capacity building and the consequent development of plans, policies and systems and the responses they supported it can be assessed as having a high value for money. It is important to highlight that this increased capacity was not limited to improved competence among its human resource but to the overall capacity of L/NNGOs. Evidence of this capacity and competence among STP partners is the CHS accreditation in Bangladesh and DRC and the PCP certification as mentioned above.

Project Cost per Country Breakdown

Country	National Partners	Cost per partner / project duration (3 years) (GBP)	Annual / Cost of supporting each partner (GBP)
Bangladesh	11	21,721	7,240
Ethiopia	10	28,794	9,598
Pakistan	12	19,431	6,477
DRC	11	30,223	10,074
Kenya	11	21,271	7,090

Source: Computation based on Shifting the Power Project – Activity-based Budgeting, project budget for four (4) major components

In terms of cost efficiency, examples were seen where savings were generated by adapting the activities and approaches. For example, at the start of STP, training courses tended to be organised for individual L/NNGOs. However, this approach was changed and as an alternative, joint training courses for L/NNGOs, were held in DRC, Bangladesh and Pakistan generating considerable cost savings (see case study – annex 4).

A comparison of their response in 2015 on organisational preparedness in terms of deployment and availability of skilled staff for emergency response shows a 50% point increase, which combines both response capacity, emergency programming and organisational policy in place which implies improved humanitarian response speed and cost savings.

Compared to three years ago how well prepared is your organisation in terms of timely deployment of adequate numbers of appropriately skilled staff for humanitarian response?

	2015	2018
Better prepared than before	17%	67%
A little more prepared	58%	31%
	2015	2018
No change	17%	0%
Less prepared	8%	0%
Don't know	0%	3%

However, this improved capacity and efficiency among L/NNGOs can be enabled or frustrated by factors such as their access (or lack of) to humanitarian funding and barriers imposed by the humanitarian system and actors as noted above. The political nature of the STP dynamics was not lost on partners who are well aware how *"the project has positively challenged institutional norms, attitudes and practices to a better direction"* (L/NNGO partner).

"... from the very beginning participating organisations committed to volunteer their resources, so the commitment was there and that was solid. As INGO partners, we did not charge management cost to the project. If you count the project funding, definitely that provided a big boost. But the process of the project, as well as the implementation among the organisations, well, it has contributed strategically, especially to local organisations, especially in terms of mentoring support." - INGO member, TWG

Collaborations established between INGOs and L/NNGOs enhanced STP but were often built on previous collaboration between partners which contributed to the efficiency of the project. Collaboration was put to the test as the project design did not allow payment of overhead costs. Commitment to the project meant voluntary contribution in terms of time and human resource for both L/NNGOs and INGOs. The involvement of the INGOs in-country varied. The INGOs hosting STP in a given country were seen as very committed but the implication of non-host INGOs varied considerably. This was compounded by expatriate staff turnover and the costs of non-host INGO staff not being programmed or compensated, for example, for their work on the TWGs. In these situations, the workload increased for the in-country STP teams.

The project design of STP had some limitations. As described above, several key components were missing, such as response financing and an INGO workstream. The project started with a strong focus on output 1 (capacity building) to the detriment of the other four outputs. This was adjusted mid-project but the late start, notably for output 2 (voice) and 3 (INGOs) led to the bulk of activities for these outputs taking place in the last six months of the project. Both L/NNGOs and INGOs commented that this meant the full potential in these areas could not be capitalised upon. The selection process for the inclusion of L/NNGOs was not considered as fully efficient, as already highlighted by the first learning review.⁹ L/NNGOs were selected by NSCs based on a broad criteria resulting in a diverse mixture of partner size and ability, with limited assessment of their potential coverage and complementarity. For example, in DRC, of all 11 L/NNGOs, not one is a women-led or focused organisation.

In its implementation, the project adopted a "one size fits all" approach to some extent. For example, the SHAPE framework, as a very comprehensive tool was considered by some L/NNGOs as too complex given their small size and activities, as indicated also in the first learning review. In a similar approach, funding grants in DRC for capacity building were the same for all L/NNGOs regardless of their size and needs. Nevertheless, STP did also have a flexibility to adapt and adjust, as seen by the INGO initiative introduced in Pakistan and the adaptations seen to the set-ups of the NSC and project teams.

Despite these limitations to project design and implementation, it should be recognised that STP did have a multiplication and replication effect increasing considerably its value for money. Several examples illustrate this point:

- In Pakistan, with the support of Tearfund, the NHN adopted the SHAPE framework and assessed 170 L/NNGOs on this basis.

9 Lewinsky, 2016, Op. Cit.

- Trained L/NNGO staff in Bangladesh were mobilized to become mentors to other organisations, i.e. those who went through the CHS accreditation process in turn mentored other L/NNGOs in the preparation of their own accreditation.
- CAFOD were considering the INGO Charter of Commitments in Pakistan as a possible model for replication in other countries.

To what extent has STP collaborated with other DEPP projects?

In general, DEPP collaboration and learning (output 4) was a lower priority for STP and focused mainly on training and learning. Collaboration was complicated by the fact that other DEPP projects did not have “collaboration with other DEPP projects” as a set goal (although DEPP overall did), in addition to their being different structures and set-ups in countries that hindered collaboration. For examples, in Bangladesh where there were four DEPP projects being implemented: TD, Communication with Communities, ALERT and STP. There was an STP NSC but there was no DEPP national body or staff to bring the projects together and create added value.

Positive examples of collaboration were seen though. In four out of five STP countries (excluding Pakistan), some 30 STP L/NNGO staff were enrolled in courses offered by the DEPP Talent Development (TD) project. L/NNGO staff also participated in DEPP learning reviews and events, such as the DEPP International Learning Conference (Kenya, December 2016). In DRC, a national learning conference for DEPP projects in 2017 led to the issuing of a policy paper appealing to strengthen locally led responses in the North Kivu province.¹⁰

Another example of collaboration was the partnership between STP L/NNGOs and the TD project that went beyond training. For example, in Bangladesh, TD interns were placed in STP L/NNGOs to work and learn, and as a result, one of the interns now works as a Program Officer for the NAHAB Secretariat in Bangladesh, which will ensure that the learning from the TD project will be brought to NAHAB. Also, Shongjog or the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities local platform has developed an agreement with NAHAB to conduct trainings on Communicating with Communities with its members. In Pakistan, Tearfund has taken the lead by involving STP L/NNGOs with the TSC project and the Age and Disability Capacity Programme (ADCAP). As a result, all STP L/NNGOs are now part of the localised surge roster and STP and TSC have collaborated with universities on a joint project (see case study – annex 4). Further, six DEPP projects met in December 2017 (Bangkok) in a workshop to consider common themes, identify learnings and next steps following the completion of all DEPP projects.

Overall, the examples indicated that collaboration has taken place more as a result of initiatives of the individual project teams or the DEPP learning staff rather than a strategic approach across all the DEPP projects.

4.5. Sustainability

STP project has built significant capacity of its L/NNGO partners and there is a growing recognition of this capacity among the L/NNGOs themselves, their INGO partners, their governments, UN agencies and even donors. But where the baselines varied, so are the levels of accomplishments in the endline and the next steps in the shifting the power ambitions. For instance, the work of STP L/NNGO partners during the 2017 flash floods in Bangladesh did not go unnoticed, and as a result, they were asked through NAHAB to lead the joint needs assessment in Netrakona District, northern Bangladesh. This was the first time that a leadership responsibility was given to an L/NNGO, which would normally be a role that an INGO or a UN agency would fulfil.

“STP has done a good job in our country. However, I cannot find indicators to say that its L/NNGO partners have graduated to the next level. We only look at building humanitarian capacity, we didn’t really look at other elements (e.g. how to sustain capacity, what to do if not, etc.). This was not thought out in the design of the project.” – Government adviser

In other places this capacity building took the form of the formalization of operations by putting in place policies and systems (HR, Finance, procurement, complaint mechanism, among others) that were originally not there despite years of operations. Or the increase in capacity and speed in responding to emergencies with

¹⁰ See DEPP, February 2018, Policy Paper: Appeal for strengthening locally led preparedness systems for disasters and emergency response in North Kivu Province: <https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/learning/policy-paper-appeal-strengthening-locally-led-preparedness-systems-disasters-emergencies-response-north-kivu-province/>

the formation of ERTs which are well-versed in rapid assessments and the use of humanitarian standards and tools.

The third STP Learning Review noted that while newly developed and refined documents will remain beyond STP, the key for sustainability at the individual organisation level will be the internal approval of these strategies and policies, and their subsequent roll-out and implementation. Feedback from L/NNGOs indicated that their approval was not yet uniform and needed further follow-up as noted above.


Sustainability must also address how it can sustain and build on the existing, tangible gains from the past 2- 3 years of implementing STP as a project. The knowledge and understanding built through the capacity building work of STP has allowed L/NNGOs and their leadership to understand and reflect on what was lacking in their previous practice, and how they can incorporate the use of standards in project development, and translate humanitarian principles in their practice.



STP Ethiopia project partners participating in key networks, taskforces and coordination meetings at district level. Credit: CAFOD Ethiopia

To what extent are the project results sustainable beyond the life of the project?

Sustaining and building on the results of the project will depend a great deal on the nature, scale and maturity of the organisations that STP will leave. This is also linked to diversity, size of operation, and scale of the humanitarian activities of the L/NNGOs, as seen in the figure below.



Diversity of STP partners by size of operation and scale of humanitarian activities (Source: STP 3rd Learning Review 2017)

As indicated in section 4.4, there was wide variation in each of the five countries in terms of the scale and reach, financial turnover, and diversity of the L/NNGOs. This variation will have an impact on the sustainability of STP's achievements within their organisations.

For example, participating L/NNGOs in Pakistan are confident that their improved governance structure will ensure their sustainability. Having improved internal systems, they are now eligible for multiple funding opportunities including UN-OCHA's Pakistan Humanitarian Pool Fund and Concern's Rapid Funds. Added to this, they reported better coordination mechanisms with their respective District Disaster Management Authority (DDMAs) including recognition by the DDMAs, jointly developed contingency plans, clearer roles and responsibilities and regular meetings.

The table below summarises the various national platforms in all five STP countries that the project has supported or collaborated with during its project life. The continuing engagement in and maximization of these platforms is also seen as a way of extending the effect of the STP as far as creating space for influencing policies related to humanitarian action, local leadership, and financing.

Existing national humanitarian platforms in STP countries

Country	Humanitarian Platform	Remarks
Bangladesh	NAHAB (National Alliance of Humanitarian Actors, Bangladesh)	NAHAB was established during the STP implementation phase and turned one year at the end of the project. It recently joined the Bangladesh HCTT; moved its secretariat from Christian Aid to L/NNGO DAM - the current chair; has secured secretariat funding for two years from Christian Aid.
DRC	Alliance of three NGO platforms: CCONAT, RHOND and FONHAD	STP supported the strengthening of the NGO platforms and their alliance, notably as a vehicle for joint advocacy.
Ethiopia	Humanitarian Forum	Platform secretariat was funded by STP under the auspices of CCRDA.
Kenya	None	In the absence of a national humanitarian platform STP INGO partners supported L/NNGO partners in their country-level advocacy and networking.
Pakistan	NHN (National Humanitarian Network Pakistan)	All STP L/NNGO partners became members of the NHN network, identified as the main alliance for humanitarian national NGOs in Pakistan. It represents local civil society groups in the HCT and has dedicated national and provincial secretariat.

What and how local/national partners and INGOs can do to continue to work towards the project's goal?

"We might be excited and we might feel like yes, we've done it – but where's the credibility, where's the acceptance? And that shift also has to happen. It is happening but it still needs a push at the UN agencies and at the government level. They are much more likely to accept and receive someone from the INGO, or from the UN than a local organisation. So, that shift still has to be made, has to take place." Country Director, INGO

Despite the significant gains of STP, this evaluation found that there was still considerable work ahead for both L/NNGOs and INGO in addressing the goals of STP. For this purposes, L/NNGOs and INGOs identified that it would be important to continue to discuss and clarify the concepts involved – in "shifting the power", the process of localisation, and the role that each one has to play and new ambitions borne of these processes.

The challenge that has surfaced for all concerned is a continuation of the discussion and dialogue between L/NNGOs and their INGO partners, and the mechanisms that created this power dynamics within the humanitarian system, which the GB and the 'Commitment for Change' documents hopes to address. The following are some of the agenda that STP partners have articulated, which they would like to address as part of the STP process:

In Bangladesh, NAHAB would like to tackle issues related to decision-making around ALERT and programme management, coming from a position of mutual strength between local and international organisations. It would also like to propose the development of a more appropriate package of capacity building support for L/NNGOs according to their respective needs and level of competency, recognizing the unevenness in the capacity of other local humanitarian actors in the field, as it also plans to expand its membership.¹¹ The government of Bangladesh has also expressed its interest in seeing the continuation of STP and similar types of interventions, which is an indicator of the effect that STP has created, and its continuing ripple effect in the sector.

In Pakistan, STP partners would like to focus next on developing networking, lobbying and negotiation/influencing skills, which was not systematically included in their capacity building. This they believe would be important in the next stage of their work as they begin to focus on humanitarian engagement at different levels.

In DRC, the country team put together an action plan to respond to output 3 (INGOs) on INGO commitments in-country to continue the work of STP; the L/NNGOs plan to continue on developing their advocacy responses through their NGO networks and maintaining their strengthened capacity through seeking diverse funding opportunities.

In Kenya, INGO partners want more engagement between partners to develop a local understanding why L/NNGOs are unable to access humanitarian resources and its implication on their sustainability and retaining capacity, and what is its implication in “shifting the power”. Other partners want to focus on creating synergy through the development consortium-building. Other partners want to continue interrogating their systems so as to continue “shifting the power” at all levels of their organisation arguing that “STP is a way of life!”

In Ethiopia, because of government restrictions on how civil society organisations operate, some L/NNGOs feel that it will be important to continuously engage in evidence-based research that can be used to advocate for changes within the government. The L/NNGOs also desire more support (or accompaniment) by the INGOs, whether or not STP continues and more support/strengthening of the Humanitarian Forum in CCRDA as their advocacy vehicle with the government. The INGOs on the other hand desire to see more accountability within the L/NNGOs and closer working relations between the various government structures and civil society organisations.

From the INGO side, while heavy lifting has taken place to work on L/NNGO partners, a lack of a similar work has been noticeable, that an internal dialogue as part of the INGO work stream may be necessary to level off on the “shifting the power” and localisation agenda, as noted above. This would be a necessary preparation in ensuring consistency in the promotion of local leadership and partnership, and in tackling the more difficult task of addressing the current donor policy framework that marginalizes local actors. Sustainability of the progress made by STP and other DEPP projects was discussed at the workshop of December 2017. At the workshop, the STP INGOs committed to continue the role of Secretariat to facilitate next steps and create a shared space for country-level groups and the international team/s¹².



First aid training at community level, Pakistan. Credit: Ms. Nayyab Asghar

¹¹ According to both its chair and adviser, NAHAB will never be a donor but it will continue to work with L/NNGOs members, while making advocacy to international donors about their WHS funding commitments.

¹² As detailed in the STP Annual Report 2017.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

This evaluation set out to assess the project's Theory of Change, that is "a shift of power towards locally owned and led responses will contribute to a more balanced humanitarian system that delivers more effective and accountable humanitarian response."

This evaluation found that capacity of the participating L/NNGOs has been strengthened through STP with changes to policies and practices that has boosted their preparedness, contribution and presence in humanitarian fora and laid the foundations for more effective and accountable humanitarian response in the five STP countries. This progress is thanks to STP in combination with other similar initiatives and the momentum created by the GB and localisation agenda. Major changes across the humanitarian system – and outside of the STP countries – are yet to be seen.

The shift of power and a re-balancing of the humanitarian system have moved at a slower pace than the strengthening of L/NNGOs in the STP countries. STP lacked some elements that could have accelerated this shift and re-balance, such as an L/NNGO funding component and an INGO workstream. But even if these additional elements were in place, the slow change of the humanitarian system and its actors would mean achieving fully its goals would have been challenging in the given timeframe of three years.

Progress was achieved by STP in what was effectively a project implementation timeframe of 2 to 2.5 years. However, in order to fully achieve what the project set out to do a timeframe of double the length would have been more realistic. As seen in other DEPP projects¹³, the time needed to adapt the UK-centric project design at the country-level and have a fully functioning project was not factored in to the original three year plan.

Having successfully established an effective STP network across five countries, it is unfortunate that funding is not yet secured to move to the next steps that would logically focus on L/NNGOs being more active in humanitarian leadership and response. This would require accelerated changes to the humanitarian system and a practical support from INGOs focused on facilitation and mentoring, and high-level change within INGOs and other international actors, as the "Walking the Talk" research summarised well:

"There needs to be a conscious 'letting go' by those that have a tight grip on power, and this requires courage and considerable adjustment to mind-sets, systems and structures".

Recommendations

Based on the evaluation's key findings a set of five recommendations is proposed:

Participating INGOs have set out the broad lines of their commitments following STP but are yet to follow this with concrete plans on how (or if) they will continue support to participating L/NNGOs. Setting in place the concrete steps is challenging but the example of the INGOs in Pakistan with the Charter of Commitment shows how a "field to HQ" approach can work. The concept of STP also needs to go beyond those within INGOs who were implementing it. Given the strengthened capacity of L/NNGOs, INGO support could take the form of facilitation (to leadership roles and funding) and mentoring that would not be costly and maintain the momentum of STP. Further, the commitments made by INGOs at the 2017 Bangkok workshop should be maintained.

- **Recommendation 1:** Participating STP INGOs should set out their plans and commitments to build on the progress achieved by STP; the next steps should be facilitated through the commitments made in Bangkok, notably the establishment of a Secretariat and finalisation of a concept note for engagement with the Start Network and donors.

Participating L/NNGOs in all countries are now in a position where they can contribute to humanitarian preparedness and response and have set out some of their follow-up actions as described above. L/NNGOs should continue to ensure that what has been built by STP remains in place and is reinforced, such as

¹³ See DEPP Learning Report, 2016: <https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/DEPP-Learning-Report-FINAL-1.pdf>

validating new policies and practices by their governance. At the same time, all signs indicate that access to resources and leadership roles will increase but only gradually.

- **Recommendation 2:** Participating L/NNGOs should ensure that new policies and practices are approved by their governance and they continue with efforts towards professionalization, such as CHS accreditation/certifications; and that they continue to increase their role in humanitarian response based on a scenario of gradual increased access to resources and leadership roles.

L/NNGO networks were proven to be key in most countries to creating a joint voice and advocating for their “place at the table”. These networks are best positioned to gain the support of their communities and authorities and pressure the “power holders” to accelerate the shifting of power.

- **Recommendation 3:** L/NNGO networks should reinforce their ability to advocate for greater leadership and resources for L/NNGOs; framework and support can be developed in collaboration with INGOs.

Affected communities and first responders have proven key to responding to crises that impact them. Future iterations of STP and like-minded projects have to put communities at the centre of their action. Positive examples were seen with this within STP that are to be encouraged. Projects have to avoid simply shifting the power from an expatriate “power holders” to a new set of local “power holders”; thus the importance of community involvement.

- **Recommendation 4:** Affected communities should be central to the design of localisation and humanitarian response initiatives; concretely this means consulting communities in the design phase of projects; building in their participation in needs assessments, project implementation (see examples in this report) and evaluation; and allocating necessary budget to do so.

The “power holders” of the humanitarian system are under pressure to adapt their policies, procedures and approaches. There have already been positive developments, such as the opening of UN Pooled Fund to L/NNGOs in many countries, the planned adaption of the Start Fund to direct funding of L/NNGOs and the greater access of L/NNGOs to the UN cluster system. Yet for L/NNGOs and communities at the front line of crises, these changes have not yet been enough and consistently applied.

- **Recommendation 5:** Those “power holders” of the humanitarian system (namely INGOs, UN agencies, donor and emerging governments) should accelerate the shifting of power with priority given to accessing humanitarian funding for L/NNGOs. INGOs can help facilitate the process of dialogue with donor agencies to accelerate the process of localisation by addressing and “honouring” the commitment donors made during the 2016 WHS.

Lessons learnt

The following five main lessons learnt were identified by this evaluation and cross-checked with the previous STP and DEPP learning reviews.

- 1. Capacity strengthening can produce results when L/NNGOs lead the process.** STP showed that capacity strengthening was successful where L/NNGOs identified their own priorities and it was not done by others. A framework anchored the capacity activities supported by ongoing follow-up and support from other L/NNGOs and partner INGOs.
- 2. STP focused on building L/NNGO capacity but the system and INGOs needed equal attention to shift the power.** STP was able to build capacity within L/NNGOs but changes within the humanitarian system and INGOs did not move at an equal pace, as was anticipated through the momentum of the GB and the localisation agenda. This indicated where a re-balance of the project's activities was needed.
- 3. Shifting the power sustainably involved fitting into or building on existing government and community preparedness systems.** STP focused on working with existing preparedness systems and set-ups and where new elements were needed, such as ERTs/RRTs and community-level response plans, STP aimed to integrate them within these systems and set-ups, which was seen as supporting sustainability.
- 4. L/NNGOs working in development proved to be capable humanitarian partners.** The majority of L/NNGOs were mainly focused on development before their involvement with STP. Their involvement in STP showed that they had the ability to carry out humanitarian operations. In this regard STP complemented well the current focus on the humanitarian-development nexus.
- 5. Collaboration between L/NNGOs can increase the reach, value for money and quality of their activities.** Whether collaborating on joint training, responses or advocacy initiatives, STP illustrated how L/NNGOs could increase their reach (e.g. through involving more L/NNGOs), value for money (e.g. cost-savings through collective training) or quality (e.g. different perspectives for a response), in addition to the exchanges and dialogues that proved motivational for L/NNGOs.

Annex 1: Evaluation matrix

Key questions	Indicators	Sources	Methods
<p>Effectiveness</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent and in what ways have capacities, leadership, and voice of the 55 local and national organisations in five countries increased? 2. How have local/national NGOs influenced decision making of, improved access on information and resources, and undertaken leadership roles in national humanitarian platforms and networks through STP? 3. In what ways has the project addressed the barriers and challenges posed by international humanitarian agencies to support new roles and ways of working with local and national organisations? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased capacities and leadership of L/NNGOs humanitarian response; accountability and preparedness • Increased voice of L/NNGOs • Extent to influenced decision making, access and leadership roles of L/NNGOs • Identification of ways STP has addressed barriers / challenges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHAPE self-assessments by (participating) L/NGOs • L/NNGOs staff • INGOs staff • Learning reviews • Project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of L/NNGOs • Survey of INGOs • Network analysis (from survey data) • In-country workshops • Semi-structured interviews • Review/analysis of SHAPE self-assessments • Case studies/snapshots • Review of learning reviews and documentation
<p>Impact</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. To what extent has STP contributed to faster, better quality and more effective humanitarian responses? 5. To what extent has the STP Theory of Change (ToC) proven to be accurate? 6. What have been the positive and negative unintended consequences of STP? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased speed of humanitarian response • Increased quality of humanitarian response • Assessment of ToC elements • Identification of unintended consequences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • L/NNGOs staff • INGOs staff • Stakeholders • Affected communities • Learning reviews • Project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of L/NNGOs • Survey of INGOs • In-country workshops • Semi-structured interviews • Focus groups • Case studies/snapshots • Review of learning reviews and documentation
<p>Relevance</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. How has the project contributed to strengthening the evidence base of what works in strengthening capacities, voice and influence of local and national organisations? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent to which STP has contributed to the evidence base 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • L/NNGOs staff • INGOs staff • Stakeholders • Learning reviews • Project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of L/NNGOs • Survey of INGOs • In-country workshops • Semi-structured interviews • Review of learning reviews and documentation

Key questions	Indicators	Sources	Methods
<p>Efficiency</p> <p>8. How has the project's governance and management structure helped shift the power?</p> <p>9. Have resources been used efficiently? In general, do the results achieved justify the costs? Could the same results be achieved with fewer resources?</p> <p>10. To what extent has STP collaborated with other DEPP projects?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent to which governance and structure shifted the power • Level of efficient use of resources • Extent to collaboration with other DEPP projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • L/NNGOs staff • INGOs staff • Learning reviews • Project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of L/NNGOs • Survey of INGOs • In-country workshops • Semi-structured interviews • Review of learning reviews and documentation
<p>Sustainability</p> <p>11. To what extent are the project results sustainable beyond the life of the project?</p> <p>12. What and how local/national partners and INGOs can do to continue to work towards the project's goal?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent to which project results are sustainable (structures and processes of L/NNGOs) • Supporting national consortiums • Identification of actions to continue the work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • L/NNGOs staff • INGOs staff • Learning reviews • Project documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of L/NNGOs • Survey of INGOs • In-country workshops • Semi-structured interviews • Review/analysis of SHAPE self-assessments • Case studies/snapshots • Review of learning reviews and documentation
<p>Conclusions and recommendations</p> <p>13. What are the key conclusions and recommendations based on the evaluation findings? What are the key lessons learnt?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of key conclusion, recommendations and lessons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N/A

Annex 2: Persons interviewed / consulted

**Includes both outcomes and/or validation workshops*

Name	Position	Organisation	Interview (I) or Workshop (W)*
Pakistan			
Aamir Kaleem	Program Manager	Oxfam	W
Abdul Sattar	DRR Forum Member	CIDP	W
Achar Brudar	Executive Director	Fast Rural Development Program (FRDP)	W
Akram Shaikh	Resource Mobilization Coordination	Tearfund	I
Ali Muhammad Sheikh	Program Manager	Research & Development Foundation (RDF)	W
Asim Jaleel	Project Manager	Tearfund	I
Atif Fayyaz	Program Coordinator	PWS	W
Dr. Shahhab Mughal	Professor	University of Jamshoro	I
Fahad Adnan	HR Manager	Grass roots Pakistan	I
Fareed Ullah	Executive Director	Participatory Rural Development Society (PRDS)	W
Fozia Kashif	Deputy Executive Director	Participatory Village Development Programme (PVDP) Sindh	W
Ghulam Hussain Chana	Assistant Deputy Director, Social Welfare Department	Government of Pakistan	I
Ghulam Hussain Kanhyo	Assistant. Director-Child Welfare	Government of Pakistan	I
Gul Shireen	Student (Volunteer)	University of Jamshoro	I
Imran Sylvester	Program Manager	Society for Safe Environment and Welfare of Agrarians in Pakistan (SEAWA)	W
Junaid Mirza	Assistant Deputy Director Social Welfare Department	Government of Pakistan	I
Kashif Siddique	DRR forum Member	Institute of Rural Development	W
Mehrab Khaskheli	Civil Defense/ Secretary District Disaster Management Authority	Government of Pakistan	I
Mehwish Hira	Program Officer	HelpAge	W
Muhammad Achar Bozdar	Executive Director	Fast Rural Development Program (FRDP)	W
Muhammad Hayat Sial	Executive Director	Participatory Welfare Services(PWS)	W
Muhammad Siddique	DRR forum Member	RDA-Thar	W
Naghmana	Program Manager	VEER Development Organization	I
Naheed Atta	Program Officer	Aware	I
Naseer Ahmad Channa	Chief Executive Officer	Bright Star Development Society Baluchistan (BSDSB)	I

Niaz Hussain Sial	Community Development Specialist	Research & Development Foundation (RDF)	W
Nisar Ahmad Soomro	DRR forum Member	Nishat Welfare Organization	W
Rizwan Iqbal	Program Coordinator, Quality & Accountability	CWS	W
Sana Basim	Capacity Building Coordinator	Tearfund	I
Sana Zulfikar	National Humanitarian Coordinator	SPO-National Humanitarian Network	I
Saroop Chnad	Deputy Director Social Welfare	Government of Pakistan	I
Shahid Saleem	Executive Director	Rural Education and Economic Development Society (REEDS)	W
Shahida Arif	Regional Learning Advisor	DEPP	W
Shahnawaz Khan	Program Manager	Muslim Aid	W
Shakeel Mukhtar	Emergency Response Coordinator	Islamic Relief Pakistan	W
Shan	Student (Volunteer)	University of Jamshoro	I
Sherzada Khan	Deputy Director of Programmes	Concern Worldwide	I
Shewaram Suthar	Program Manager	Association for Water, Applied Education & Renewable Energy (AWARE)	W
Sohrab Lashari	Assistant Revenue Officer	Government of Pakistan	I
Syed Ali Shah	Staff	Participatory Rural Development Society (PRDS)	I/W
Syed Sulaiman	Humanitarian Programme Advisor	Concern Worldwide	W/I
Umer Iqtidar	Evaluation officer	ActionAid	W
<i>16 community members from Umerkot district in the Sindh province, Pakistan.</i>			
Bangladesh			
Abdul Lateef	Consultant	Consultant for Department of Disaster Management and NAHAB	I
Abdus Salam	Chief Executive	Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK)	I
AKM Musha	Executive Director	Concern Worldwide	I
Alexander Tripura	Program Officer – Disaster Management	Caritas Bangladesh	W
AM Nasir Uddin	Manager- DRR	ActionAid Bangladesh	I
Anjum Nahed Chowdhury	Director – Rohingya Response/STP Focal point	Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK)	I
Badrun Nahar	Program Officer – NAHAB Secretariat	Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM)	I/W
Farah Kabir	Country Director	ActionAid Bangladesh	I
Francis Atul Sarker	Executive Director	Caritas	I
Joya Prasad	Project Coordinator	Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK)	W
Kajal Ahmed Leon	Knowledge Management Officer	Shifting the Power, Christian Aid	I
Manik Saha	Project Officer – STP	Christian Aid Bangladesh	W

Md. Ehsanur Rahman	Executive Director, DAM and Chairperson (NAHAB)	DAM	I
Md. Ershad Ali	Senior Coordinator	Sajida Foundation	W
Md. Iqbal Hossain	Project Manager	CwC, BBC Media Action	I
Md. Jahangir Alam	Deputy Director/ STP Focal point	Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM)	I/W
Md. Reaz Ahmed	Director General	Department of Disaster Management	I
Mohammad Alamgir Rahman	Joint Director	Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK)	W
Patrick Palma	Capacity Building Advisor	Tearfund	I
Rahat Ara	Programme Officer - Capacity Building	Christian Aid Bangladesh	W
Roxana Rahim	Program Officer	Christian Aid Bangladesh	W
Sajid Raihain	Start Fund Country Manager	Start Fund Bangladesh	I
Satchidanda Biswas Satu	Assistant Director	Shushilan	W
Shahana Hayat	Project Manager, Talent Development	Save the Children Bangladesh	I
Shakeb Nabi	Country Director	Christian Aid	I
Shamsun Naima Rahman	Manager – STP (new)	Christian Aid Bangladesh	W
Shiplab Chakma	Humanitarian Response Coordinator	Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM)	I
Sinajul Islam	Program Coordinator	Association for Voluntary Actions for Society (AVAS)	W
Suman Das	Project Manager	ELNHA, Oxfam	I
Syed Rezaul Haas	Disaster Manager	Amra Kaj Kory (AKK)	W
Sylvester Michael Medhu	Program Manager	Concern Worldwide	W
Kenya			
Ahmed Ibrahim Abdi	Executive Director	ALDEF	I/W
Abdi Noor Ragow	Senior Disaster Management Officer	Wajir County Government	I
Abdifah Abdikadir	Project Officer	WASDA	W
Abdifatah yare	CEO	WASDA	W
Abdirizak Mohamed	Project Officer	WASDA	W
Ahmed Ali	Project Officer	ALDEF-KENYA	W
Amal mohamed	Project Officer	WASDA	W
Amos Pkiach	Accountant	POWEO	W
Ayisha Nur	Emergency Officer	Christian Aid	I

Bante Galgalo	DP&R Manager	Caritas Marsabit	W
Bijay Kumar	Country Director	ActionAid Kenya	I
Blandina Bobson	Country Learning Advisor	DEPP	I
Bonaventure Ndena	Driver	ActionAid Kenya	W
Boru Mole	Accountant	PACIDA	W
Caleb Moseti	Intern	Caritas Maralal	W
David Lokelesia	Accountant	SIKOM Peacenet	W
Denis Orioki	Capacity Building Coordinator	ActionAid Kenya	W
Dub Guyo	Programmes Manager	PACIDA	W
Evans Onyiego	Director	Caritas Maralal	W
Fr. Stephen Murage	Director	Caritas Isiolo	W
Gladys Wathanga	Country Representative	Tearfund Kenya	I
Grace Ileri	Program Manager	STP Kenya	I/W
Hassan Kalmoy	Field Officer	National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Wajir County	I
Hellen Chepkorir	Vice Chair, Board of Management	Pokot Women Empowerment Organisation (POWEO)	I/W
Issack A. Mohamed	County Drought Response Officer	National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Wajir County	I
James Jirm Galgalo	Emergency Program Officer	CAFOD	I/W
Jeremiah Nakwanga	Volunteer	Lokori Branch, Kenya Red Cross Society	I
Joan Okoth	Programme Officer	SIKOM Peacenet	W
Joseph Akoule	Executive Director	SIKOM Peace Network, West Pokot County	I/W
Kevin Majoni	Communications Liaison Officer	ActionAid Kenya	W
Keziah Adhiambo	Communications Officer	PACIDA	W
Leah Psiya	Executive Director	Pokot Women Empowerment Organisation (POWEO)	I/W
Lucy Espila	Project Officer	Caritas Maralal	W
Magdalene Kague	Finance Manager	Tearfund Kenya	I
Mohamed Kuresh Abikar	Programme Manager	ALDEF-KENYA	W
Mohamed Siyad Abdullahi	Finance Manager	ALDEF-KENYA	W
Nakito Emmanuel	Volunteer	Lokori Branch, Kenya Red Cross Society	I/W
Naom Kemunto	Data Clerk	Caritas Maralal	W

Osman Sheikh Dahir	Programme Manager	WASDA	W
Patrick Kibe	Programmes Coordinator	ADSMKE-Mwea	W
Patrick Nyaga	Programmes Coordinator	ADSMKE-Isiolo	W
Pauline Ekomwa	Volunteer	Lokori Branch, Kenya Red Cross Society	I/W
Phillip Ekiru	Programmes Coordinator	Caritas Maralal	W
Phyllis Ntinyari	Accountant	Caritas Isiolo	W
Ronald Ratemo	Project Officer	Caritas Isiolo	W
Rukia Abubakar	Cash Transfer Program Officer/ Branch Focal Person	Lokori Branch, Kenya Red Cross Society	I/W
Sabdio Jirm	Assistant Project Officer	Caritas Marsabit	W
Sammy Guchu	Finance Officer	Caritas Marsabit	W
Selina Ngolenyang	Member, Board of Management	Pokot Women Empowerment Organisation (POWEO)	I/W
Stephen Murage	Director	Caritas Isiolo	I
Sumananjali Mohanti	Country Director	Oxfam Kenya	I
Timothy Letooyia	County Drought Response Officer	NDMA West Pokot County	I
Wincata Wanja	Programmes Accountant	ADSMKE	W
Yasmin akyar	Project Officer	ALDEF-KENYA	W
Ethiopia			
Alemayehu Koysa	MEAL Coordinator	Terepeza Development Association (TDA)	I/W
Allesandro Bini	Country Representative	Concern Worldwide (Still new)	I
Amanuel Assegid	Coordinator	National Humanitarian Forum in CCDRA	I
Ayele Sepao	Sustainable Agriculture & Emergency Preparedness Specialist	ActionAid	I
Bereket Tassew	Director	TDA	I
Biniam Hailu	Humanitarian program coordinator	AVHO (Apostolic Vicarage of Hossana)	I
Biresaw Geremew	Women Empowerment Programme Coordinator	Women Support Association (WSA)	W
Conor Molloy	Country Representative	CAFOD, SCIAP & Trocaire (CST)	I
Daniel Gebremedhin	Programme Manager	STP	I
Dawit Melese	Health coordinator	AVHO (Apostolic Vicarage of Hossana)	I
Desalegn Demissie	Program Officer (DRR and Food Security)	Tearfund Ethiopia	I
Elias Jovani	MEAL Head	WSA	I/W
Fikreab Mekebo	women's and children and migration section head	AVHO (Apostolic Vicarage of Hossana)	I

Hajo Aliyle	Senior Programme Coordinator	Rift Valley Children and Women Development Association (RCWDA)	W
Hellen Asnake	Regional Learning Advisor	DEPP	I
Kidist Haile-mariam	Project Coordinator	SOS Sahel	W
Mandefro Anyalem	Resilience Coordinator	ActionAid	I
Mohammed Hussen	Disaster Risk Management Officer	Community Initiatives, Facilitation and Assistance (CIFA)	W
Muluneh Tesfaye	Executive branch director	AVHO (Apostolic Vicarage of Hossana)	I/W
Tesfaye Anjulo	DRM Coordinator	Hossana Region Ethiopia	I
Tesfaye Doboeh	Agronomist	AVHO (Apostolic Vicarage of Hossana)	I
Tilahun Tadesse	Food Security & Livelihoods Officer	TDA	I
Wakuma Chimsa	Programme Manager	Association for National Planned Program for Vulnerable Children And in Need-Ethiopia (ANNPCAN)	W
Workayu Bizu	Executive Director	ANNPCAN	I
Yosef Endrias	Food security and humanitarian section head	AVHO (Apostolic Vicarage of Hossana)	I/W
DRC			
Angelani Kayumba	MEL STP	CAFOD	I/W
Arsene Kirhero	(former) Program Manager	STP	I
Baudoin Djuma	Asssociate Humanitarian Affairs Officer	UN-OCHA	I
Bernard Balibuno	Country Representative	CAFOD	I
Kasika Kibatsi	Head of Division	Provinciale des Affaires Humanitaire Nord Kivu	I
Jolien Van Ooijen	Humanitarian Programme Manager and North Kivu Head of Office	Christian Aid	I
Ignace Buguma	Area Manager North Kivu	Concern Worldwide	I
Augustin Karume	Advisor	CCONAT	I/W
Eddie Yamwenziyo	Coordinator of emergencies	Caritas Goma	I/W
Emile Muderhwa	Head of programmes	FONAHD	I/W
Fred Kande Buingo	(former) Capacity Building Officer	STP	I/W
Yves Ngunzi Kahashi	Learning Advisor	DEPP	I/W
Carlos Muyayalo	Humanitarian Focal Point	CEDERU	W

Christophe Assongwa	Emergency Program Manager	CAFOD	W
Didier Amani Sangara	MEAL Officer	Caritas Goma	W
Dr Guy Byavulwa Mugashane	Head of Project / emergencies	Caritas Congo	W
Dr Kakisimbi	Advisor	CCONAT	W
Gilbert Bisimwa	Humanitarian Capacity Development Advisor	CAFOD	W
Joseph Kasoro Kwonke	Head of HR	PPSSP	W
Patrice Muamba	Head of Operations	HEAL Africa	W
Paul Bulambo	Head of programmes	CADI	W
Paulin Bishakabalya	Deputy Coordinator	CODEVAH	W
Prince Kabenga	Focal Point STP	PACODEVI	W
Roger Kayenga	Head of programmes	BOAD	W
Romaine Bashizi	Head of emergencies	ECC MERU	W
Stephan Kanyama	Head of projects	Ceprossan	W
<i>15 community members from Kibumba, North Kivu province, DRC</i>			
International			
Bob Ruxton	Head of International Support	Concern Worldwide	I
Coree (Marie) Steadman	International Project Manager	STP	I
Michael Mosselmans	Head of Humanitarian Policy, Practice, Advocacy and Programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean	Christian Aid	I
Oenone Chadburn	Head of Humanitarian Support	Tearfund	I
Sonya Ruparel	International Humanitarian Programme Manager	ActionAid	I
Tilleke Kieweid	Humanitarian Capacity Development Advisor	Oxfam International	I
Vittorio Infante	International Advocacy Advisor	ActionAid	I

Annex 3: Documents consulted

The main documents consulted for the evaluation are listed below. In addition, at least 50 internal documents and reports were consulted, such as advocacy and capacity building plans, humanitarian strategies and plans, minutes of meetings, training reports and presentations of L/NNGOs summarising their activities and achievements.

DEPP Learning Report, 2016
DEPP, Policy Paper: Appeal for strengthening locally led preparedness systems for disasters and emergencies response in North Kivu Province, February 2018
Start Fund Management Response; Localisation Review, July 2017
GPPI, Independent Grand Bargain Report 2017
IFRC, World Disaster Report 2015
STP, Annual Report 2015
STP, Annual Report 2016
STP, Annual Report 2017
STP, Case studies (29 individual cases), 2015-2017
STP, Emmens, B. and Clayton, M., Localisation of Aid: Are INGOs Walking the Talk? 2017
STP, Global Baseline Report, December 2015
STP, Introduction to the humanitarian capacity self-assessment process
STP, Lewinsky, T., Getting into SHAPE? A Review of Shifting the Power's Organisational Capacity Assessment Approach. STP learning review 1, November 2016
STP, Rogers, E., How has Shifting the Power influenced local and national partner's responses to emergencies? STP learning review 3, September 2017
STP, Tanner, L., Increasing the Voice and Influence of Local and National NGOs, STP learning review 2, October 2017
STP, Quarterly Reports, 2015-2017
STP, Walking the Talk, Country Reports (five), 2017

Annex 4: Case studies and snapshots

Case study – Pakistan – Tapping into youth resource for localisation – university students in Sindh

“Training youths in a community can contribute in resilience of that very community but training and motivated students can have force multiplier effect” (FRDP).

Youth if tapped into appropriately can make one of the best resources to take any progressive agenda forward. However, this is not usually the case when it comes to the so-called developing nations who are often faced with multiple challenges and their resources are under exploited including their human resources particularly youth. The case of Pakistan is not different either. Despite abundance of resources including 60% of its population being youth, Pakistan has an unfortunate history, full of human sufferings, both due to manmade and natural disasters. In the past two decades alone, the country witnessed several catastrophic events including the devastating earthquake of 2005, massive displacement from Malakand Division in 2009, floods 2010, 2011 and recent displacement from Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – adjoining the Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa province of Pakistan.

The support to respond to the disasters both from within as well as from the international community was remarkable. Nevertheless, much is yet to be done to better prepare at risk communities to identify the hazards, take actions to mitigate the risks, build resilience and respond effectively in case of future disasters. All this is not possible without strong and effective grassroots organisations that have the motivation and skill-sets to plan and respond to disasters effectively. Fast Rural Development Program (FRDP) – a local NGO in Sindh province that came into existence in 2004 strongly believes in the localisation agenda and the capacities of local people especially youth as the first responder to any disaster situation. With its mission ‘to promote self-resilience of communities by organizing and mobilizing them; and contributing to sustainable development through integrated, inclusive, environment-friendly approach’, the organisation has been advocating for people centred approaches. Its partnership with STP not only further strengthened its conviction but the capacity strengthening allowed advocating for this cause more effectively.

The FRDP’s partnership with STP (and the Transforming Surge Capacity Project) occurred at a very critical time as the organisation though believing in localisation had not taken any practical steps. Moreover, the learning from its own response to 2010 floods primarily due to lack of skills did not provide a strong legacy to continue humanitarian response particularly with limited capacity. The partnership with STP proved to be an opportunity by providing a very clear roadmap on how to strengthen the capacity, improve the humanitarian response as well as contribute to the localisation agenda. Therefore, the FRDP welcomed this initiative. Engagement with disaster affected or at risk communities including youth was central to the partnership and hence the FRDP while thinking out of the box engaged university students with an anticipated multiplier effect of them playing the role of catalysers in their own communities.

As part of the STP project, the FRDP had engaged Dr. Shahab Mughal from the University of Jamshoro who was used to facilitate trainings on different subjects. One day he was talking about the accessibility problem for students with disabilities at the university and the unavailability of any facility if something bad happens. He mentioned in particular that for a multiple storey library building, there is only one exit door. The university is housing 35,000 students but has no fire extinguisher even, let alone other safety measures.

Reflecting on this situation the colleagues within FRDP realized not only the risk of having no proper identification of the hazards and measures to reduce the risks but the enormous potential the university has in the form of its huge student population. From there the idea of engaging this enormous but untapped resource came into existence. The FRDP submitted a concept note of training students of third and final years in emergency preparedness and response. With agreement from STP, the FRDP signed an MoU with the University of Jamshoro. Accordingly, it was agreed that the enrolled students would be provided with five days of training. It was further set out in the MoU that the trained students would cascade the learning to their fellow students. The logic behind selecting students from final years in particular was to have a cohort who are about to exit the university and can be part of the ERTs in their own localities. In this way, it will produce a trickle-down effect particularly in areas where an NGO such as FRDP may not reach easily as the majority of the students are mostly from very remote parts of Sindh.

Initially 80 students were selected but because of the tremendous interest from students, the FRDP ended up training 120 students. The training was organized during gaps between semesters or after students' examination to ensure less or no adverse effects on trainees' studies – a strategy that worked well. The topics included practical skills in emergency response and relief, first aid, and the theory around DRR i.e. terminologies like vulnerability, resilience, hazards etc. At the end of each training a test was administered and the results of the tests were linked with incentives. The incentive was that the FRDP will provide the top 20 trained students with one month paid internship. In order to create this incentivized program in true letter and spirit, the FRDP had signed MOUs with different institutes and organisations such as Institute of Rural Management (IRM), Pakistan Village Development Program (PVDP), Society for Safe Environment and Welfare of Agrarians in Pakistan (SSEWA-Pak) etc. The primary purpose was to ensure that these partner organisations would offer internships to the FRDP's trained students as a priority.

The next cohort was provided with three days training and were then sharing the information and knowledge with fellow students. With this approach, the FRDP could develop a pool of volunteers. Volunteers have selected a coordinator among themselves, who plays a role of bridge between volunteers and the university. Currently the volunteers are involved actively in the management of events in the university internally but are readily available to be immediately deployed in case of any emergency hit the area.

The FRDP has high hopes from this volunteer force. The FRDP wants to build further on their capacities to make this set-up sustainable. In parallel, the FRDP is in negotiation with Sindh university to start offering diploma or certification programme on DRR so that more youth can be provided with structured training. Fortunately the current Vice Chancellor is very open to the proposal. Unfortunately, The FRDP currently has no resources to link specialist with the university to develop their required programme. Similarly, the lengthy government processes to approve any such programme is also a challenge. But through STP, FRDP has successfully piloted how effectively the partnership of civil society organizations and academic institutes can utilize the power of youth and build on this untapped resource to face future challenges more appropriately.

Case Study – Ethiopia – Emergency Response Team has helped AVHO reduce their response time in crises

The Apostolic Vicariate of Hosanna (AVHO) is one of the Diocese of the Catholic Church in Ethiopia having both pastoral and social and development wings. AVHO falls within the social and development wing of the Ethiopian Catholic Diocese and was established in June 2010, after the formation of the Diocese in January 2010.

AVHO implements programs in the Southern Nationalities and People's Region (SNPR) but covers two zones – Hadiya and Kembata Zones. The main program activities (sectors) of AVHO include: education services in both primary and secondary schools; provision of curative and preventive health services; food security and livelihoods; relief activities during emergencies; and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). At the start, AVHO programs focused more on development with little attention to humanitarian response which implied a very late response to emergencies due to procedures such as procurement, staff recruitment, and lack of understanding of humanitarian standards.

At the beginning of the STP project, AVHO undertook an assessment via the SHAPE framework and consequently identified the gaps in their humanitarian response towards the end of 2015 and early 2016. The gaps were categorized per sector and solutions focused on implementing the first three priorities in each sector. An assessment report was drafted and action plans to address the gaps; with support from CST (Cafod, SCIAF and Trocaire), whom they were collaborating with before in various projects such as nutrition.

The most common emergency seen is drought. However, there are also incidents of floods and landslides, disease outbreaks (affecting both human and livestock) which are usually as a consequence of drought. Prior to STP, AVHO responded to these emergencies (particularly drought) through both development and humanitarian responses – for instance emergency response leading to recovery/rehabilitation such as supplementary nutrition program through stabilization centres in the health centres and seed recovery. They also implemented pond construction, livestock medicine distribution, livelihoods projects and women empowerment projects.

With STP, AVHO adopted a new way of thinking, particularly in helping them identify organisational gaps and responding to disasters. They therefore worked on different policies and strategies such as administrative procedures in humanitarian response. They also realised they had no specific strategies for humanitarian response. But due to STP, they developed a Humanitarian Response Strategy and they engaged in different capacity building for staff. This helped them to be better prepared to respond to humanitarian emergencies both internally and through collaboration with related government agencies such as ministry of health and Disaster Risk Reduction.

Before STP, AVHO was managing humanitarian response using internal procedures (e.g. finance and procurement) that were geared to development projects. However, the challenge was that these procedures were quite bureaucratic and not timely. STP helped AVHO to align their procedures to humanitarian response while their capacity and systems were strengthened and improved.

Concretely, STP enabled AVHO to form a 10-member ERT in 2017, which was one of the points outlined in the action plans. The Team is composed of the following team members: The Executive Director who is the ERT Team leader; Women, Children and Migration Section Head; Food Security and Humanitarian Section Head who is also ERT focal person; Humanitarian Program Coordinator; Health Coordinator; and Agronomist. Other members of the team include the Finance Coordinator and M&E Coordinator; education coordinator; and the logistics focal person.

The team draws from the experiences of its members from the various sections. Prior to STP, AVHO only had two staff responsible for responding to humanitarian emergencies, but with the formation of the ERT, the team is now able to have a faster response.

For example, AVHO used to respond to provision of seed emergencies within 3 to 4 months. But after STP, they were able to implement it within 15 days, to the surprise of their donors, who visited to verify the reduced timeline. Thanks to STP, the response was improved because of a shifting in thinking, and the ERT working together through improved systems. For instance, AVHO added the responsibility of being ERT team members to the job descriptions of the various section heads; created a database for contacts, engaged with suppliers to ensure faster response; and they also developed an ERT Guide, which details the procedures of deployment by ERT members during an emergency response. To AVHO, this is more like a "Surge Capacity" in responding to emergencies. Basically, their way of thinking has changed!

The 15-day response time, was achieved because the ERT worked together, and a joint assessment was undertaken with the government disaster response management agency, which took only 1 day as opposed to previously when it would take an extended time frame of back and forth communication. The ERT divided the tasks and these were planned within one week and they involved community volunteers, an initiative under the auspices of STP.

The main lesson for AVHO is that the change and impact of the project has mainly been because of the philosophy – changing their way of thinking. The perspectives of AVHO towards humanitarian response has changed. For instance, they did not add any new staff but restructured how to utilize the existing staff and developed a preparedness plan. They also were able to use their capacity to fundraise and also influence the government through the establishment of a joint DRM team in their zones. This has now enabled AVHO to plan together with the government. AVHO assert, *"It's not the money value with DRM but the changed way of thinking to influence the government and increasing AVHO's visibility. So overall it is more of the change and shifting in philosophies within the organisation."*

Case study – Kenya – Community-Based STP as implemented Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) incorporating Community Volunteers

The community in Lokori used to see KRCS vehicles responding to emergencies. One day in early 2016, one community member demanded to know from KRCS what exactly they do. The KRCS official explained to them what KRCS does and said the community was free to join as volunteers. This prompted five women to register as volunteers. Later in August 2016, KRCS returned and informed them about STP and registered more community members, reaching 15 volunteers – but the number grew to 30 (18 women and 12 men).

They were trained on the following under STP's output of capacity building:

- Dissemination of KRCS fundamental principles
- Reporting tools such assessment tools, situation report (SITREP)
- First aid in conflict
- KIRA – Kenya Integrated Rapid Assessment
- Proposal Writing and Concept Paper

After the training, the volunteers were involved in an emergency response to a drought including a cash transfer program, distribution of food, destocking of weak livestock with a monetary compensation, provision of hay for animals, and livestock immunization which was funded by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

The volunteers continued with monitoring of the cash transfer program, which is a KRCS program. The program was triggered after the STP training, particularly on the KIRA Needs Assessments Training. The volunteers were involved in undertaking the needs assessments and reporting which enabled them to be at the forefront in responding during an emergency response in 2017.

Before KRCS would respond in various areas but with STP, the community in Lokori area was involved in emergency response. The area in Lokori is within a conflict area since Turkana County borders with Pokot East area.

KRCS had been considering how to involve volunteers, given the long distance from Lodwar Town, the capital of Turkana County. KRCS selected Lokori (Turkana East Sub County), which had many conflict incidents and they felt volunteers were needed there most. They therefore decided to invest in training volunteers in Turkana East Sub County (i.e. Lokori).

The volunteers have found that a community-based response has enabled them to get more involved in meeting their needs and thereby saving more lives. The volunteers are now empowered to request ambulances during emergencies. However, the community still has challenges of floods, drought and disease outbreaks. For such issues, they liaise with KRCS but also they have a voice and access to the office of the local administrators to seek their assistance. This is something they had not been doing before. For example, when livestock were raided from the community, they approached the district administrator who assisted the affected community.

The changes seen include: KRCS previously did not involve community volunteers and this has consequently reduced their workload; the KRCS team and volunteers can work concurrently and combine their work, especially in reaching out to community members who may not be literate; and this has also helped KRCS be forewarned to avoid certain risky routes because they receive information from the community.

KRCS has ensured the community volunteers are given some compensation although the volunteers also have their own income generating activities. One of the lessons learnt in this community-based STP model, is the power in community in initiating responses. And volunteers have been empowered to engage with local authorities (e.g. chiefs) and this has helped them in undertaking community activities.

Case study - value for money - capacity building activities of STP

Throughout its three-year timespan, STP has sought to increase the value for money of its activities and consequent outcomes. Given that capacity building activities accounted for some half of all budget expenditures¹⁴, this area was a focus for all countries in finding cost-saving measures.

A main activity of capacity building was the training of staff and volunteers of the participating L/NNGOs. In this respect, examples were seen where efficiencies were sought:

- Using rooms and facilities of partner INGOs and L/NNGOs for training courses instead of renting training facilities;
- Using NGO and L/NNGO staff to conduct the training courses rather than outside training consultants where possible and feasible;
- Vetting of participants to ensure that only relevant L/NNGO staff and volunteers attended the training courses;
- Focusing on collective training courses for L/NNGO staff and volunteers rather than individual courses for each L/NNGO.

STP paid attention to ensure that the training was matched to the needs of the L/NNGOs based on their capacity building plans. Therefore, participation in collective training courses was dependent on the relevance of the training subjects to the given L/NNGOs.

An analysis of the nine training courses offered in Pakistan by STP in 2016 and 2017 illustrates the value for money of using collective courses instead of more individual or limited courses. The following table shows that the average cost per participant (per day) ranged from 39 to 149 GBP, with the number of partners ranging between 6 to 26 and participants from 17 to 29 (n.b. training courses were in general open to other L/NNGOs in addition to STP partners).

2016/2017 STP training courses in Pakistan


Subject	Date	Location	No. of L/NNGOs	No. of participants	Total cost of training (GBP)	Cost per participant	Cost per participant per days
Training on International Humanitarian Standards	May-16	Multan	26	29	3,426	118	39
Training on International Humanitarian Standards	Jun-16	Hyderabad	15	29	3,796	130	44
Training on PARCEL (Partners Capacity Enhancement in Logistics)	Feb-17	Hyderabad	14	25	3,494	140	47
Consultation workshop on Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan	May-17	Hyderabad	6	26	4,909	189	63
Training on Localized Surge Roster	Feb-17	Islamabad	12	24	12,597	525	105

¹⁴ 54% in 2016 and 57% in 2017 (source; STP Annual Reports, 2016 and 2017).

Subject	Date	Location	No. of L/NNGOs	No. of participants	Total cost of training (GBP)	Cost per participant	Cost per participant per days
Training on Monitoring and Evaluation in Humanitarian Setting	Oct-16	Islamabad	13	27	8,831	327	109
Consultation workshop on Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan	May-17	Rahim-yarkhan	6	22	7,462	339	113
Training on Emergency Preparedness and Response Training	Nov-16	Murree	12	23	8,168	355	118
Consultation workshop on Organisational Strategy	Jul-16	Islamabad	6	17	5,062	298	149

The following graph shows the training courses comparing the number of L/NNGOs and participants to total costs per day per participant. The graph illustrates that costs per participants reduced nearly four-fold as the number of participants and L/NNGOs increased.

2016/17 training courses in Pakistan – number of partners, participants and cost*



*Scales adjusted to show comparable graph plot trends.

A calculation can be made predicting the total cost of training if STP continued to train smaller number of participants and partners at high cost. The following table illustrates the predicted cost of all training in Pakistan if the highest cost per participant (525 GBP) was maintained. Compared to the actual costs per participant this shows a potential cost saving of nearly 60,000 GBP.

High cost scenario compared to actual scenario of 2016/2017 STP training courses in Pakistan

Scenario	Cost per participant (GBP)	Number of persons trained	Total costs (GBP)
High cost scenario	525	222	116,550
Actual scenario	118-525	222	57,745
		Potential cost saving:	58,805

Bangladesh snapshot - Lucky Apa: A woman-led response guided by personal compassion and humanitarian professionalism

It will take a while before an expression of recognition comes across if you ask people in the sprawling Cox's Bazar Block F, about Anjum Nahed Chowdhury. But if you ask for Lucky Apa (sister), people will immediately know who you're talking about. Lucky Apa is the Projects Director of Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK), a local Bangladesh NGO, and she oversees and manages all of the humanitarian projects of her organisation. She is also GUK's focal person for STP from since the start of the project, and the only woman among the focal persons nominated by the 11 L/NNGOs involved. She shared that there is a predominant lack of recognition of women's performance and capacity in the country, which is perhaps her way of explaining why she was the only woman in the group.



Lucky Apa meeting the Rohingya women they support from Block F, Cox's Bazar. Credit: AM Dizon.

When asked about STP, she said that it was *"a good idea for the capacity building of local organisations because it helped develop organisational systems (e.g. HR policy, Gender policy, Humanitarian strategy, etc.) and capacity, and not just the individual staff. In the process, it developed the whole organisation."* She appreciated the process followed by STP in Bangladesh, where the 11 organisations rotated the hosting of meetings and were thus allowed to see the operations of each of the organisation.

At the personal level, Lucky Apa shared that being the only female focal person for STP, the project gave her the opportunity to explore and make use of her knowledge and experience and do things she did not realize she could do. For example, she provided technical assistance support to the other five organisations in preparing for their international CHS certification, after she led the same process in GUK. Now, all six organisations are CHS certified, a milestone, which many other local organisations in many countries have not yet achieved.

Her experience of being involved with STP, according to her *"really help build her confidence, improved her knowledge, and influenced her attitude as a humanitarian worker."* When asked to explain further she said that while making use of the standards and other guidelines used in humanitarian work, she also learned to use her *"feelings for the most vulnerable people"* to guide her work and to actively listen to them. Because of this, she believes that she was able to guide GUK's emergency interventions to make it more sensitive to the needs of the people that they support. For example, by listening

to the women in one of their gathering at the Women and Child Friendly space, she learned that the Rohingya women do not want to use the bathing facilities that were close to the men's facilities because of safety concerns and personal embarrassment. Because of this, all GUK built toilets and bathing facilities that are not only gender-segregated but are also built far away from each other. As a result, women and girls are now regularly and confidently using these facilities for their own hygiene purposes.

Another concern that she found after talking to the women is their problem feeding their families with the food ration that they are receiving. This is because the WFP rations provided do not include spices that define their food and taste, hence, their families could and will not eat the food, affecting their nutritional health, especially the children. To help address this issue, in a meeting with the women and the lead researchers from the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI), who were doing their data gathering at the time, Lucky Apa conveyed the problem raised by the women. In so doing she managed to get the HHI researchers to support putting up a 'Spice Corner' in all of the common cooking spaces in the blocks managed by GUK for the Rohingya refugee families. On the day of our interview Lucky received news that there were enough funds to support the 'Spice Corner' for another three months. It's a small gesture, a solution to the problem that the women themselves raised but means a lot in terms having a decent meal that conforms to their cultural taste.

In parting, Lucky Apa expressed her appreciation to STP *"for giving me the opportunity to build my capacity, for being there to promote women leadership, especially Christian Aid¹⁵, for their appreciation of and opportunity to show what I can do."*

At present, GUK holds partnership agreements and implements humanitarian projects with UNICEF, UN-FPA, UNDP and WFP for the Rohingya emergency response, and with Christian Aid and UNDP for both the Rohingya response and the North Flood response in Gaibandha. And Lucky Apa oversees all of these projects on behalf of her organisation.

DRC snapshot – Collective advocacy by three NGO platforms

The three main L/NNGO platforms in DRC joined forces in 2017 for an advocacy initiative supported by STP. The three platforms, CCONAT, FONAHAD and RONHD mobilized around a common advocacy plan focused on national authorities, donors, missions, INGOs and UN agencies in the capital, Kinshasa.

"STP brought the three platforms together and supported us to put together a joint advocacy plan for the first time" commented Emile Muderhwa of FONAHAD.

The ten person delegation visited Kinshasa in November 2017 with several key subjects to raise including the recognition of the role of L/NNGOs in humanitarian response, support for the localisation agenda and the access and participation of L/NNGOs in national humanitarian forums and platforms. Although it was a first initial advocacy initiative, some progress could be seen, such as:

- The proposed national humanitarian law was discussed with a commitment of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to consult L/NNGOs in the drafting phase.
- The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs took into account the feedback of the L/NNGOs on the proposed solidarity fund for humanitarian response with the support of parliamentarians secured.
- The Ministries of Planning and Humanitarian Affairs committed to facilitate the accreditation of L/NNGOs.
- UNOCHA considered the request to increase the number of L/NNGO representatives in the key humanitarian forums and decision-making bodies.
- Legal recognition of the three L/NNGO platforms was also raised.

"There are opportunities for the networks to influence but given the complexity of the humanitarian system in DRC this will take time and follow-up" concluded Emile. Following this initial advocacy initiative, the three platforms created a joint operational plan for 2018 to guide their future activities together.

Kenya snapshot – Pokot Women Empowerment Organisation (POWEO)

Pokot Women Organisation (POWEO) started in December 2013 after women leaders from West Pokot County were identified by ActionAid to attend a women's leadership forum in Kakamega County, Kenya. The workshop involved, among others, issues of women empowerment, engaging in business and advancing through education. POWEO was born after the training, with the aim of actualizing what they had learnt towards uplifting the status of women in West Pokot County, Kenya.

After the formal registration, POWEO began advocating for girls to go to school. This is because girls in their community from nine years old onwards are married off and never complete their schooling. The members of POWEO, decided to lead by example, following their involvement with STP to return to school to complete their education, at the various levels they had left school at. One of POWEO Board Members explains:

"When we received STP funding, we received various training, such as leadership training, which triggered some of us to vie for elective positions in the previous general election held in 2017. In addition, thanks to STP, we were motivated to return to school to complete various courses (e.g. secondary schooling) because the leadership positions required some minimum educational qualifications [such as completion of basic secondary level education]. Consequently, I enrolled to complete my Diploma in HR training, which is something that was triggered by STP – basically the project opened our eyes!"

Some of the personal achievements from being involved with STP include:

- One of the POWEO Board Members was appointed to the Board of Management in four schools within West Pokot County;
- Another member of POWEO feels that STP has made her courageous and she can now address people in community meetings without fear;
- The members of POWEO have been appointed to various community-led initiatives such as bursary committees and committee treasurer in the local dispensary; and
- Some POWEO members are actively engaged in business. For instance, one of the members has a contract to supply kangumus (half-cake) to various schools within the county.

From all the exposure and learning in STP, POWEO's vision is to give back to the local community through empowering and cascading what they learnt to the local community, including humanitarian issues. The Board members of POWEO will continue fundraising for their organisation so that they can grow, be sustainable and further implement what STP has helped them achieve. And finally, they will ensure they work closely with the county government in the implementation of humanitarian activities, especially those that affect women and girls.



A group of women from the Pokot Women Empowerment Organisation participating in a manifestation organised on the occasion of the World Humanitarian Day on 19th August 2016 in Pokot, Kenya. Credit: Samuel Nzioka, ActionAid Kenya.

Pakistan snapshot- Naheed Atta- Program Officer, Aware, Umerkot

"I am not merely a Program Officer with my organisation rather I am an advocate of localisation. As a transformed person, I am among those who strongly believe in the capacities of the locals as the first responders despite they often being the victims of the disasters". Reflecting further Naheed recalled "I still remember the day I started my journey with STP while taking part in the assessment of my organisation "Aware". I have mixed feelings of pride and still being half way in achieving our objectives". For Naheed, the sense of pride was due to the realization of their capacities while much is yet to be achieved. This realization had such a strong influence effect that since that day she never stopped deepening her understanding of the localisation agenda. She highlighted the Localized Surge Capacity workshop and the STP learning review workshop in 2016 as several examples where her understanding was deepened.

Sharing her ideas about the localisation, Naheed strongly argued that the humanitarian workers as change agents must be staunch believers of the localisation themselves. They should have full conviction that the local communities and actors can contribute greatly in the effectiveness of disaster prevention and response provided their capacities are strengthened. Concerning her own consciousness about the situation, she would unintentionally mark and analyze every potential hazard and its probability to turn into risks, *"I would think of the messy traffic, the school gate right on the road, the increasing sea level and fast disappearing cultivated land of my city Umerkot and their potential impact on the local people".*

Such reflection helps her to take her job as a mission and not merely an assigned task. Referring to her personal preferences, Naheed said that like other women around her, she rarely talked about clothes and jewelry but rather would talk to her family and other women about what they can do to prevent and respond to disaster. Concerning the biggest achievement, she mentioned the establishment of ERTS as community level. Further, that the ERTs were involved in contingency plans developed with District Planning offices.

Reflecting on the timeframe, she said that as the third year of STP, they were about to close the project but she thought that this was not enough time to do justice to the heavy agenda of localisation. She knows that no one can ensure continuous support and they need to find ways to mobilize the needed resources which is possible but would require a strong buy-in from all key stakeholders including District Offices and District Disasters Management Authority. Though they developed district contingency plans, somehow they still think it is the role of NGOs to take the lead in emergency response. Being a woman from this locality, she never faced any issue to work but she would admit that she still doesn't feel comfortable at government offices; she wished that there were more women officers at these offices, she concluded.

Pakistan snapshot - Akram Sheikh, Coordinator Network and Resource Mobilization, Tearfund

Akram Sheikh is working as Resource Mobilization Coordinator with Tearfund Pakistan in the STP funded project. As Coordinator his main responsibilities included strengthening relationships among peers, linking them up with relevant networks and facilitate development of their linkages with donor agencies with a primary objective of diversifying their funding based for increased sustainability.

Concerning his experience with STP, Akram excitedly shared that this was a wonderful experience. Being a multi country project, STP allowed for interacting with local organisations and provided an opportunity for collaboration with other countries. The cross-country learning was a great opportunity for Akram to learn how other country programmes were implementing the project. Likewise, interacting with NSC and TWG was also a new experience in his professional career. STP also helped deepen his understanding of the humanitarian sector.

Concerning STP's achievements, Akram shared that the project truly enabled the local organisations to identify their weaknesses and shortcomings through a robust process of need assessment of their respective organisations. Following the assessment, the STP facilitated capacity strengthening of individual organisations, resulting in improved policies and systems. Since the partners were steering the process, hence they fully owned the process. The local partners were effectively linked with different donors at

local and national level that contributed in their enhanced visibility and provided them an opportunity to profile their issues at appropriate levels.

The Disaster Risk Reduction forum of Sindh and MOUs of partner organisations with their respective DDMAs under STP project are among the other major achievements highlighted by Akram. A digital resource centre was an innovation of the STP being implemented by NHN mentioned by Akram. The centre held several online sessions on preparedness and response. Material of quality substance is accessible on the centre to NHN member organisations including the participating STP L/NNGOs.

From a personal experience perspective, Akram mentioned that working with STP provided him with an opportunity to work at national level. Similarly, he was able to interact with diverse organisations and a broad range of development and humanitarian workers – an experience that deepened his skills, knowledge and overall understanding of the sector. He also mentioned that thanks to STP, he learnt that L/NNGOs are equally skilled, competent and hardworking and with a little financial and capacity strengthening support they can produce considerable results.

With regards to achievement of STP around the localisation agenda, Akram found that STP had done a commendable job to accelerate the localisation of aid agenda. Under STP, the comprehensive “Walking the talk” research report paved the way for critical discourse and was widely read in Pakistan. In this respect, Akram highlighted the achievement of STP in establishing the local initiative for INGOs, the Charter of Commitment.

Akram in his personal capacity pledged that he will apply his networking skills in future by working with like-minded individuals and organisations to advocate for accelerating the localisation agenda. Likewise, he mentioned that STP was driven and owned by local partners. They developed and implemented their capacity strengthening plans that resulted in their improved systems. Drawing on this approach, Akram was of the opinion that provided the L/NNGOs are involved in the decision-making process not only increases their ownership but contributes significantly to the sustainability of interventions. In order to ensure localisation, autonomy and independence of L/NNGOs is of paramount importance according to Akram.

Annex 5: STP logframe with endline results

The following table is a summarised version of the STP logframe with endline results as found by this evaluation highlighted in red.

IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline (2015)	Endline (2018)
More effective and accountable delivery of humanitarian assistance to disaster affected communities	Increased speed of humanitarian response	Planned	NA	Improved delivery time of humanitarian response
		Achieved		Examples were seen which illustrate L/NNGOs were moving towards increased speed of response.
	Impact Indicator 2		Baseline	Target (date)
	Increased quality of humanitarian response	Planned	NA	Improved quality of humanitarian response
Achieved			Indications which illustrate L/NNGOs were move towards increased quality of response included strengthened capacity of L/NNGOs; response closer to the community; validation by third party quality assurance.	
OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline	Target (date)
L/NNGOs in 5 countries have increased capacity to determine and deliver emergency preparedness and response	% of supported L/NNGOs that report a positive shift against the prioritized indicators of the SHAPE framework	Planned	0%	70%
		Achieved		97% of the surveyed L/NNGOs indicated that the overall capacity of their organisations for humanitarian response has increased in the past three years
	Outcome Indicator 2		Baseline	Target
	Improved influence and inter-connectedness of L/NNGOs within each countries' humanitarian space	Planned	2.9 (out of 5.0)	Increased global self-assessment score (from the baseline)
Achieved			74% of surveyed L/NNGOs reported that participation of national aid workers, organisations and authorities in the coordination of planning and project design had increased in the past three years	

L/NNGOs in 5 countries have increased capacity to determine and deliver emergency preparedness and response	Outcome Indicator 3		Baseline	Target (date)
	% of L/NNGOs reporting an increased influence on the humanitarian system in their country	Planned	0%	60%
		Achieved		89% of surveyed L/NNGOs responding that their participation and voice had increased in the past three years.
	Outcome Indicator 4		Baseline	Target (date)
	# of documented examples/case studies of STP INGO Consortium members changing policies or practices in response to L/NNGOs recommendations for better partnership	Planned	0	6 examples/case studies documented
		Achieved		75% of surveyed INGOs reported that they had changed an element of their policy or practice in direct response to a request or suggestion from a national/local partner in the past three years.
OUTPUT 1	Output Indicator 1.1		Baseline	Target (date)
L/NNGO partners in 5 countries have the knowledge, skills, processes, and policies to prepare for and respond effectively to emergencies	# of L/NNGOs partners with demonstrated improvements on targeted dimensions of the SHAPE Framework	Planned	0	45 partners (85%) demonstrate improvements on targeted dimensions
		Achieved		All L/NNGOs participating in workshops (50) indicated that they had improved their targeted dimensions of the SHAPE framework.
	Output Indicator 1.2		Baseline	Target (date)
	% of supported L/NNGO that introduce new or improved policies and procedures (e.g. emergency preparedness plans)	Planned	0%	80%
		Achieved		All L/NNGOs participating in workshops (50) indicated that they had introduced new or improved policies and procedures in the past three years.
	Output Indicator 1.3		Baseline	Target (date)
% of supported L/NNGOs taking documented action following-up on capacity strengthening plans	Planned	0%	70%	
	Achieved		All L/NNGOs participating in workshops (50) indicated that they had taken actions to follow-up on capacity strengthening plans.	
		Baseline	Target (date)	

OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1		Baseline	Target (date)
L/NNGOs are better represented and have a stronger voice in relevant humanitarian platforms and networks in their countries	% of L/NNGOs reporting stronger engagement on targeted relevant platform and networks within the country context	Planned	0	70%
		Achieved		92% of surveyed L/NNGOs had in official humanitarian working groups, networks, or coordination mechanisms in the past three years
	Output Indicator 2.2		Baseline	Target (date)
	# of documented cases of L/NNGOs lobbying/taking collective action to change humanitarian policy and practice	Planned	0	At least 10 documented cases (2 per country)
Achieved			84% of surveyed L/NNGOs had been involved in lobbying others or taking collective action to improve humanitarian policy and practice in the past three years.	
OUTPUT 3	Output Indicator 3.1		Baseline	Target (date)
Shifting the Power consortium member INGOs recognise and respond to local/national organisations capacity, leadership & voice	% of STP consortium member INGOs having developed and/or improved partnership policies/procedures/tools that recognise leadership of local/national partners	Planned	0	80 % of INGOs country level developed and /or improved partnership policies/procedures/tools
		Achieved		76% of surveyed INGOs' partnership policies/procedures/tools that recognise leadership of local and national actors have increased in the past three years.
	Output Indicator 3.2		Baseline	Target (date)
	Documented examples of Consortium INGOs promoting L/NNGOs to deliver and determine emergency response	Planned	0	at least 4 examples documented at country level
		Achieved		Examples seen of INGOs promoting L/NNGOs to deliver and determine emergency response, such as charter of commitment in Pakistan signed by 4 INGOs.
	Output Indicator 3.3		Baseline	Target (date)
% of L/NNGOs reporting new ways of working and improved relationship with Consortium INGOs	Planned	0	80%	
	Achieved		84% of surveyed L/NNGOs reported new ways of working and improved relationships with the international NGOs that are part of STP in the past three years.	

OUTPUT 4	Output Indicator 4.1		Baseline	Target (date)
Shifting the Power collaborates with the other DEPP projects for maximising collaborative advantage	All key project learning and tools are shared with the other DEPP projects	Planned	0	at least 11 Key StP learning and tools shared to DEPP projects
		Achieved		Over 11 STP learning and tools shared with other DEPP projects.
OUTPUT 5	Output Indicator 5.1		Baseline	Target (date)
The project provides evidence of good practice in strengthening L/ NNGOs humanitarian preparedness and response work and their role/ influence in humanitarian action.	Synthesis of lessons learned on strengthening national capacity across 5 country contexts is documented and shared	Planned	0	One synthesis report developed and shared
		Achieved		Three annual reports and three learning reports created and shared.
	Output Indicator 5.2		Baseline	Target (date)
	Number of learning documents and good practices captured, documented and shared	Planned	0	Over 11 STP learning and tools shared with other DEPP projects
Achieved			Over 30 case studies created and shared.	

Annex 6: Survey questions

Shifting the Power – end of project evaluation survey – L/NGOs

Section 1: About you

1. What is your job title? (If more than one person is completing this questionnaire, please add details)

2. Are you...?

- female
 male

Section 2: About the organisation you work for

3. What is the name of the organisation that you work for?

4. In your opinion, which of the following descriptions most closely describes your organisation? (select one)

- Local NGO or community based organisation (you operate in one community or location within a country)
 National NGO or community based organisation (you operate across the whole country, but not outside of it)
 International NGO (you operate in more than one country and have country offices / country programmes)
 Other organisation (please describe)

5. In which of the following countries are you working?

- Pakistan
 Kenya
 Ethiopia
 Bangladesh
 DRC

Section 3: Your organisation's staff

Thinking about the staff in your organisation who have *direct responsibility for humanitarian response programmes* (not including support staff such as financial or administrative staff)...

6. Our humanitarian field staff have up to date knowledge of core humanitarian standards (such as Red Cross Code of Conduct, CHS and Sphere standards).

- Strongly agree
 Agree
 Neither agree nor disagree
 Disagree
 Strongly disagree

7. Our technical staff have received relevant training to update their skills in the last three years (2015-2017).
- Yes
 No
8. In the last three years, has support to capacity building on humanitarian response for local and/or national NGOs...?
- Increased
 Decreased
 Stayed roughly the same
 Don't know
9. Compared to three years ago (2015), how well prepared is your organisation in terms of timely deployment of adequate numbers of appropriately skilled staff for humanitarian response?
- Better prepared than before
 A little more prepared
 No change
 Less prepared
 Don't know
10. Compared to three year ago, the overall capacity of your organisation for humanitarian response has:
- Increased
 Decreased
 Stayed roughly the same
 Don't know
11. To what extent has Shifting the Power (STP) project contributed to building your capacity in the last three years?
- Not at all
 A little
 Somewhat
 Quite some
 A lot

Section 4: Thinking about funding opportunities in your country

12. Does your organisation have its own emergency reserve funds you can use in emergencies (to begin operations in advance of new donor funding for response)?
- Yes
 No
 Don't know

13. In the last three years (2015-2017) did your organisation access funding from ... (choose all that apply)?

- International NGOs
- UN agencies working in humanitarian aid
- UN other
- Central government departments
- Provincial government departments
- Foreign governments (bi-lateral donors)
- Regional intergovernmental organisations
- Other international donors (multi-lateral donors)
- None of the above

14. In the last three years, has your organisation led on writing a proposal for funding for humanitarian response? (This means your organisation taking the lead on the submission, rather than being a sub or applying as a partner to another organisation.)

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

15. In the last three years, has your organisation led in the design or implementation of a joint humanitarian needs assessment or evaluation?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

16. Compared to three year ago, funding opportunities for your organisation have:

- Increased
- Decreased
- Stayed roughly the same
- Don't know

17. To what extent has STP contributed to building your funding opportunities in the last three years?

- Not at all
- A little
- Somewhat
- Quite some
- A lot

Section 5: Influence of National / Local Partners

18. In the last three years, has your organisation participated in any official humanitarian working group, network, or coordination mechanisms (such as UN cluster meeting, working groups, humanitarian agencies coordination group, etc.)?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

19. In the last three years, has your organisation led (i.e. chaired or taken other official position on) any humanitarian working group, network, or coordination mechanisms?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

20. Compared to three years ago (2015), has participation of national aid workers, organisations and authorities in the coordination of planning and project design:

- Increased
- Decreased
- Stayed roughly the same
- Don't know

21. In the last three years, has your organisation been involved in lobbying others or taking collective action to improve humanitarian policy and practice in this country?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

22. If yes, was your organisation mostly:

- Leading lobbying efforts
- Working equally with others
- Working with others, but not leading the lobbying efforts
- Working alone
- Don't know
- Not applicable

23. Compared to three year ago, have your ways of working and relationships with the international NGOs that are part of STP:

- Improved
- Worsened
- Stayed roughly the same
- Don't know

24. Compared to three year ago, the participation and voice of your organisation in the humanitarian system has:

- Increased
- Decreased
- Stayed roughly the same
- Don't know

25. To what extent has STP contributed to increasing your participation and voice in the last three years?

- Not at all
 A little
 Somewhat
 Quite some
 A lot

Section 6: Networks: About the contact with other organisations

26. Please list the 6 humanitarian actors / organisations you work most frequently with on humanitarian issues. For each one, mark how equal the relationship is, where 5 is where you have a lot of voice and influence and are able to influence their plans as equals and 1 is where you don't have any influence or only implement the plans they give you.

	1 – no voice and influence	2	3	4	5 – lot of voice and influence
<insert organisations' names in rows below>					
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					

Do you have any other comments or feedback about this survey or any of the issues raised?

Thank you for your participation in our survey.

END OF SURVEY

Shifting the Power - end of project evaluation survey – INGOs

Section 1: About you

1. What is your job title? (If more than one person is completing this questionnaire, please add details)

2. Are you...?

- Female
- Male

Section 2: About the organisation you work for

3. What is the name of the organisation that you work for?

- ActionAid
- CAFOD
- Christian Aid
- Tearfund
- Concern Worldwide UK
- Oxfam GB
- Other (please specify)

4. In which of the following countries are you based?

- Pakistan
- Kenya
- Ethiopia
- Bangladesh
- DRC
- UK Head office --> skip to question 6
- Other, please specify:

Section 3: Humanitarian networks

5. Please list the 6 humanitarian actors / organisations you work most frequently with on humanitarian issues. For each one, mark how equal the relationship is, where 5 is where you have a lot of voice and influence and are able to influence their plans as equals and 1 is where you don't have any influence or only implement the plans they give you.

	1	2	3	4	5
<insert organisations' names in rows below>					
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					

Section 4: Influence of National / Local Partners

6. Would you describe your organisation as a partnership organisation (meaning: you work predominantly through national / local partners)?

- Yes
 No

7. Do you have any internal policy and procedure documents that cover working with national and local NGOs/CSOs during an emergency response?

- Yes
 No
 Don't know

8. To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements:

"Our organisation's internal policies make it difficult to negotiate partnership agreements with L/NNGOs as our policies and procedures are not very flexible."

- Strongly disagree
 Disagree
 Neither agree nor disagree
 Agree
 Strongly agree

9. "Most local / national NGOs we partner with do not currently have the technical capacity to play a bigger role in humanitarian response."

- Strongly disagree
 Disagree
 Neither agree nor disagree
 Agree
 Strongly agree

10. "Most local / national NGOs we partner with do not currently have the governance structures and leadership capacity to play a bigger role in humanitarian response."

- Strongly disagree
 Disagree
 Neither agree nor disagree
 Agree
 Strongly agree

11. Compared to three years ago (2015), has participation of local and national organisations and authorities in the coordination of humanitarian response in this country:

- Increased
 Decreased
 Stayed roughly the same
 Don't know

12. Compared to three years ago (2015), have resources and support for humanitarian capacity building for local and national actors:

- Increased
 Decreased
 Stayed roughly the same
 Don't know

13. Compared to three years ago (2015), your organisation's partnership policies/procedures/tools that recognise leadership of local and national actors have:

- Increased
 Decreased
 Stayed roughly the same
 Don't know

14. Can you think of an example where, in the last three years (2015–2017), your organisation has changed an element of its policy or practice in direct response to a request or suggestion from a national/local partner?

- Yes
 No
 Don't know

15. If yes, could you please briefly describe this example/these examples:

16. To what extent has Shifting the Power (STP) project contributed to your organisation changing its policies and approaches to working with local and national partners for humanitarian response?

- Not at all
 A little
 Somewhat
 Quite some
 A lot

Section 5: Thinking about your recent lobbying or advocacy activity

17. In the last three years, have local or national NGOs worked with your organisation in lobbying others or taking collective action to improve humanitarian policy and practice?

- Yes
 No
 Don't know

18. If yes, was the local or national NGO mostly:

- Leading lobbying efforts
- Working equally with others
- Working with others, but not leading the lobbying efforts
- Working alone
- Don't know
- Not applicable

19. Do you have any other comments or feedback about this survey or any of the issues raised?

Thank you for your participation in our survey.